428f1333ac
* refactor(session): store user ID in session instead of full struct
Replaces storing the full User object in the session cookie with just
the user ID. GetLoginUser now re-fetches the user from the database on
every request so credential/permission changes take effect immediately
without requiring a re-login. Includes a backward-compatible migration
path for existing sessions that still carry the old struct payload.
* feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change
checkLogin middleware now detects default admin/admin credentials and
redirects every panel route to /panel/settings until they are changed.
The settings page auto-opens the Authentication tab, shows a
non-dismissible error banner, and lists 'Default credentials' first in
the security checklist. Login response includes mustChangeCredentials
so the login page can redirect directly. Logout is now POST-only.
Password must be at least 10 characters and cannot be admin/admin.
* feat(settings): redact secrets in AllSettingView and add TrustedProxyCIDRs
Introduces AllSettingView which strips tgBotToken, twoFactorToken,
ldapPassword, apiToken and warp/nord secrets before sending them to
the browser, replacing them with boolean hasFoo presence flags. A new
/panel/setting/secret endpoint allows updating individual secrets by
key. Secrets that arrive blank on a save are preserved from the DB
rather than overwritten. Adds TrustedProxyCIDRs as a configurable
setting (defaults to localhost CIDRs). URL fields are validated before
save.
* fix(security): SSRF prevention, trusted-proxy header gating, CSP nonce, HTTP timeouts
Adds SanitizeHTTPURL / SanitizePublicHTTPURL to reject private-range
and loopback targets before any outbound HTTP request (node probe,
xray download, outbound test, external traffic inform, tgbot API
server, panel updater). Forwarded headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For,
X-Forwarded-Host) are now only trusted when the direct connection
arrives from a CIDR in TrustedProxyCIDRs. CSP policy is tightened with
a per-request nonce. HTTP server gains read/write/idle timeouts. Panel
updater downloads the script to a temp file instead of piping curl into
shell. Xray archive download adds a size cap and response-code check.
backuptotgbot is changed from GET to POST.
* feat(nodes): add allow-private-address toggle per node
Adds AllowPrivateAddress to the Node model (DB default false). When
enabled it bypasses the SSRF private-range check for that node's probe
URL, allowing nodes hosted on RFC-1918 or loopback addresses (e.g.
a private VPN or LAN setup).
* chore: frontend UX improvements, CI pipeline, and dev tooling
- AppSidebar: logout via POST /logout instead of navigating to GET
- InboundList: persist filter state (search, protocol, node) to
localStorage across page reloads; add protocol and node filter dropdowns
- IndexPage: add health status strip (Xray, CPU, Memory, Update) with
quick-action buttons
- dependabot: weekly go mod and npm update schedule
- ci.yml: add GitHub Actions workflow for build and vet
- .nvmrc: pin Node 22 for local development
- frontend: bump package.json and package-lock.json
- SubPage, DnsPresetsModal, api-docs: minor fixes
* fix(ci): stub web/dist before go list to satisfy go:embed at compile time
* chore(ui): remove health-strip bar from dashboard top
* Revert "feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change"
This reverts commit 56ce6073ce09f08147f989858e0e88b3a4359546.
* fix(auth): make logout POST+CSRF and propagate session loss to other tabs
- Switch /logout from GET to POST with CSRFMiddleware so it matches the
SPA's existing HttpUtil.post('/logout') call (previously 404'd silently)
and blocks GET-based logout via image tags or link prefetchers. Handler
now returns JSON; the SPA already navigates client-side.
- Return 401 (instead of 404) from /panel/api/* when the caller is a
browser XHR (X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest) so the axios interceptor
redirects to the login page on logout-in-another-tab, cookie expiry,
and server restart. Anonymous callers still get 404 to keep endpoints
hidden from casual scanners.
- One-shot the 401 redirect in axios-init.js and hang the rejected
promise so queued polls don't stack reloads or surface error toasts
while the browser is navigating away.
- Add the CSP nonce to the runtime-injected <script> in dist.go so the
panel loads under the existing script-src 'nonce-...' policy.
- Update api-docs endpoints.js: GET /logout doc entry was missing.
* fix(settings): POST /logout after credential change
* fix(auth): invalidate other sessions when credentials change
When the admin changes username/password from one machine, sessions
on every other machine kept working until they manually logged out
because session storage is a signed client-side cookie — there is
no server-side session list to revoke.
Add a per-user LoginEpoch counter stamped into the session at login
and re-verified on every authenticated request. UpdateUser and
UpdateFirstUser bump the epoch (UpdateUser via gorm.Expr so a single
update statement is atomic), so any cookie issued before the change
no longer matches the user's current epoch and GetLoginUser returns
nil — the SPA's 401 interceptor then redirects to the login page.
Backward compatible: the column defaults to 0 and missing cookie
values are treated as 0, so sessions issued before this change
remain valid until the first credential update.
---------
Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
169 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
169 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"net/http"
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"text/template"
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"time"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/logger"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/web/middleware"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/web/service"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/web/session"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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)
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// LoginForm represents the login request structure.
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type LoginForm struct {
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Username string `json:"username" form:"username"`
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Password string `json:"password" form:"password"`
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TwoFactorCode string `json:"twoFactorCode" form:"twoFactorCode"`
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}
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// IndexController handles the main index and login-related routes.
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type IndexController struct {
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BaseController
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settingService service.SettingService
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userService service.UserService
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tgbot service.Tgbot
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}
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// NewIndexController creates a new IndexController and initializes its routes.
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func NewIndexController(g *gin.RouterGroup) *IndexController {
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a := &IndexController{}
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a.initRouter(g)
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return a
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}
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// initRouter sets up the routes for index, login, logout, and two-factor authentication.
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func (a *IndexController) initRouter(g *gin.RouterGroup) {
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g.GET("/", a.index)
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g.GET("/csrf-token", a.csrfToken)
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g.POST("/login", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(), a.login)
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g.POST("/logout", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(), a.logout)
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g.POST("/getTwoFactorEnable", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(), a.getTwoFactorEnable)
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}
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// index handles the root route, redirecting logged-in users to the panel or showing the login page.
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func (a *IndexController) index(c *gin.Context) {
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if session.IsLogin(c) {
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c.Header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
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c.Redirect(http.StatusTemporaryRedirect, c.GetString("base_path")+"panel/")
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return
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}
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serveDistPage(c, "login.html")
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}
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// login handles user authentication and session creation.
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func (a *IndexController) login(c *gin.Context) {
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var form LoginForm
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if err := c.ShouldBind(&form); err != nil {
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pureJsonMsg(c, http.StatusOK, false, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.invalidFormData"))
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return
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}
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if form.Username == "" {
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pureJsonMsg(c, http.StatusOK, false, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.emptyUsername"))
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return
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}
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if form.Password == "" {
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pureJsonMsg(c, http.StatusOK, false, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.emptyPassword"))
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return
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}
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remoteIP := getRemoteIp(c)
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safeUser := template.HTMLEscapeString(form.Username)
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timeStr := time.Now().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")
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if blockedUntil, ok := defaultLoginLimiter.allow(remoteIP, form.Username); !ok {
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reason := "too many failed attempts"
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logger.Warningf("failed login: username=%q, IP=%q, reason=%q, blocked_until=%s", safeUser, remoteIP, reason, blockedUntil.Format(time.RFC3339))
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a.tgbot.UserLoginNotify(service.LoginAttempt{
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Username: safeUser,
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IP: remoteIP,
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Time: timeStr,
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Status: service.LoginFail,
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Reason: reason,
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})
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pureJsonMsg(c, http.StatusOK, false, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.wrongUsernameOrPassword"))
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return
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}
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user, checkErr := a.userService.CheckUser(form.Username, form.Password, form.TwoFactorCode)
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if user == nil {
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reason := loginFailureReason(checkErr)
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if blockedUntil, blocked := defaultLoginLimiter.registerFailure(remoteIP, form.Username); blocked {
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logger.Warningf("failed login: username=%q, IP=%q, reason=%q, blocked_until=%s", safeUser, remoteIP, reason, blockedUntil.Format(time.RFC3339))
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} else {
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logger.Warningf("failed login: username=%q, IP=%q, reason=%q", safeUser, remoteIP, reason)
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}
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a.tgbot.UserLoginNotify(service.LoginAttempt{
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Username: safeUser,
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IP: remoteIP,
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Time: timeStr,
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Status: service.LoginFail,
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Reason: reason,
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})
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pureJsonMsg(c, http.StatusOK, false, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.wrongUsernameOrPassword"))
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return
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}
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defaultLoginLimiter.registerSuccess(remoteIP, form.Username)
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logger.Infof("%s logged in successfully, Ip Address: %s\n", safeUser, remoteIP)
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a.tgbot.UserLoginNotify(service.LoginAttempt{
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Username: safeUser,
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IP: remoteIP,
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Time: timeStr,
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Status: service.LoginSuccess,
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})
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if err := session.SetLoginUser(c, user); err != nil {
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logger.Warning("Unable to save session:", err)
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return
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}
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logger.Infof("%s logged in successfully", safeUser)
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jsonMsg(c, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.successLogin"), nil)
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}
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func loginFailureReason(err error) string {
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if err != nil && err.Error() == "invalid 2fa code" {
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return "invalid 2FA code"
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}
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return "invalid credentials"
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}
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// logout clears the session. The SPA performs the navigation client-side.
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func (a *IndexController) logout(c *gin.Context) {
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user := session.GetLoginUser(c)
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if user != nil {
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logger.Infof("%s logged out successfully", user.Username)
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}
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if err := session.ClearSession(c); err != nil {
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logger.Warning("Unable to clear session on logout:", err)
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}
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c.Header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"success": true})
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}
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// csrfToken returns the session CSRF token. Public — the login page
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// needs a token before authenticating.
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func (a *IndexController) csrfToken(c *gin.Context) {
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token, err := session.EnsureCSRFToken(c)
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if err != nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"success": false, "msg": err.Error()})
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return
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"success": true, "obj": token})
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}
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// getTwoFactorEnable retrieves the current status of two-factor authentication.
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func (a *IndexController) getTwoFactorEnable(c *gin.Context) {
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status, err := a.settingService.GetTwoFactorEnable()
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if err == nil {
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jsonObj(c, status, nil)
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}
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}
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