428f1333ac
* refactor(session): store user ID in session instead of full struct
Replaces storing the full User object in the session cookie with just
the user ID. GetLoginUser now re-fetches the user from the database on
every request so credential/permission changes take effect immediately
without requiring a re-login. Includes a backward-compatible migration
path for existing sessions that still carry the old struct payload.
* feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change
checkLogin middleware now detects default admin/admin credentials and
redirects every panel route to /panel/settings until they are changed.
The settings page auto-opens the Authentication tab, shows a
non-dismissible error banner, and lists 'Default credentials' first in
the security checklist. Login response includes mustChangeCredentials
so the login page can redirect directly. Logout is now POST-only.
Password must be at least 10 characters and cannot be admin/admin.
* feat(settings): redact secrets in AllSettingView and add TrustedProxyCIDRs
Introduces AllSettingView which strips tgBotToken, twoFactorToken,
ldapPassword, apiToken and warp/nord secrets before sending them to
the browser, replacing them with boolean hasFoo presence flags. A new
/panel/setting/secret endpoint allows updating individual secrets by
key. Secrets that arrive blank on a save are preserved from the DB
rather than overwritten. Adds TrustedProxyCIDRs as a configurable
setting (defaults to localhost CIDRs). URL fields are validated before
save.
* fix(security): SSRF prevention, trusted-proxy header gating, CSP nonce, HTTP timeouts
Adds SanitizeHTTPURL / SanitizePublicHTTPURL to reject private-range
and loopback targets before any outbound HTTP request (node probe,
xray download, outbound test, external traffic inform, tgbot API
server, panel updater). Forwarded headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For,
X-Forwarded-Host) are now only trusted when the direct connection
arrives from a CIDR in TrustedProxyCIDRs. CSP policy is tightened with
a per-request nonce. HTTP server gains read/write/idle timeouts. Panel
updater downloads the script to a temp file instead of piping curl into
shell. Xray archive download adds a size cap and response-code check.
backuptotgbot is changed from GET to POST.
* feat(nodes): add allow-private-address toggle per node
Adds AllowPrivateAddress to the Node model (DB default false). When
enabled it bypasses the SSRF private-range check for that node's probe
URL, allowing nodes hosted on RFC-1918 or loopback addresses (e.g.
a private VPN or LAN setup).
* chore: frontend UX improvements, CI pipeline, and dev tooling
- AppSidebar: logout via POST /logout instead of navigating to GET
- InboundList: persist filter state (search, protocol, node) to
localStorage across page reloads; add protocol and node filter dropdowns
- IndexPage: add health status strip (Xray, CPU, Memory, Update) with
quick-action buttons
- dependabot: weekly go mod and npm update schedule
- ci.yml: add GitHub Actions workflow for build and vet
- .nvmrc: pin Node 22 for local development
- frontend: bump package.json and package-lock.json
- SubPage, DnsPresetsModal, api-docs: minor fixes
* fix(ci): stub web/dist before go list to satisfy go:embed at compile time
* chore(ui): remove health-strip bar from dashboard top
* Revert "feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change"
This reverts commit 56ce6073ce09f08147f989858e0e88b3a4359546.
* fix(auth): make logout POST+CSRF and propagate session loss to other tabs
- Switch /logout from GET to POST with CSRFMiddleware so it matches the
SPA's existing HttpUtil.post('/logout') call (previously 404'd silently)
and blocks GET-based logout via image tags or link prefetchers. Handler
now returns JSON; the SPA already navigates client-side.
- Return 401 (instead of 404) from /panel/api/* when the caller is a
browser XHR (X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest) so the axios interceptor
redirects to the login page on logout-in-another-tab, cookie expiry,
and server restart. Anonymous callers still get 404 to keep endpoints
hidden from casual scanners.
- One-shot the 401 redirect in axios-init.js and hang the rejected
promise so queued polls don't stack reloads or surface error toasts
while the browser is navigating away.
- Add the CSP nonce to the runtime-injected <script> in dist.go so the
panel loads under the existing script-src 'nonce-...' policy.
- Update api-docs endpoints.js: GET /logout doc entry was missing.
* fix(settings): POST /logout after credential change
* fix(auth): invalidate other sessions when credentials change
When the admin changes username/password from one machine, sessions
on every other machine kept working until they manually logged out
because session storage is a signed client-side cookie — there is
no server-side session list to revoke.
Add a per-user LoginEpoch counter stamped into the session at login
and re-verified on every authenticated request. UpdateUser and
UpdateFirstUser bump the epoch (UpdateUser via gorm.Expr so a single
update statement is atomic), so any cookie issued before the change
no longer matches the user's current epoch and GetLoginUser returns
nil — the SPA's 401 interceptor then redirects to the login page.
Backward compatible: the column defaults to 0 and missing cookie
values are treated as 0, so sessions issued before this change
remain valid until the first credential update.
---------
Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
160 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
160 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"errors"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/database"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/database/model"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/logger"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/util/crypto"
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ldaputil "github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/util/ldap"
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"github.com/xlzd/gotp"
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"gorm.io/gorm"
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)
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// UserService provides business logic for user management and authentication.
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// It handles user creation, login, password management, and 2FA operations.
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type UserService struct {
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settingService SettingService
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}
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// GetFirstUser retrieves the first user from the database.
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// This is typically used for initial setup or when there's only one admin user.
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func (s *UserService) GetFirstUser() (*model.User, error) {
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db := database.GetDB()
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user := &model.User{}
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err := db.Model(model.User{}).
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First(user).
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Error
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return user, nil
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}
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func (s *UserService) CheckUser(username string, password string, twoFactorCode string) (*model.User, error) {
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db := database.GetDB()
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user := &model.User{}
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err := db.Model(model.User{}).
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Where("username = ?", username).
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First(user).
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Error
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if err == gorm.ErrRecordNotFound {
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return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
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} else if err != nil {
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logger.Warning("check user err:", err)
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return nil, err
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}
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if !crypto.CheckPasswordHash(user.Password, password) {
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ldapEnabled, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapEnable()
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if !ldapEnabled {
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return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
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}
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host, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapHost()
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port, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapPort()
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useTLS, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapUseTLS()
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bindDN, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapBindDN()
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ldapPass, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapPassword()
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baseDN, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapBaseDN()
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userFilter, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapUserFilter()
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userAttr, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapUserAttr()
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cfg := ldaputil.Config{
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Host: host,
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Port: port,
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UseTLS: useTLS,
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BindDN: bindDN,
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Password: ldapPass,
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BaseDN: baseDN,
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UserFilter: userFilter,
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UserAttr: userAttr,
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}
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ok, err := ldaputil.AuthenticateUser(cfg, username, password)
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if err != nil || !ok {
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return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
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}
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}
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twoFactorEnable, err := s.settingService.GetTwoFactorEnable()
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if err != nil {
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logger.Warning("check two factor err:", err)
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return nil, err
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}
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if twoFactorEnable {
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twoFactorToken, err := s.settingService.GetTwoFactorToken()
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if err != nil {
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logger.Warning("check two factor token err:", err)
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return nil, err
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}
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if gotp.NewDefaultTOTP(twoFactorToken).Now() != twoFactorCode {
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return nil, errors.New("invalid 2fa code")
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}
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}
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return user, nil
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}
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func (s *UserService) UpdateUser(id int, username string, password string) error {
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db := database.GetDB()
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hashedPassword, err := crypto.HashPasswordAsBcrypt(password)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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twoFactorEnable, err := s.settingService.GetTwoFactorEnable()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if twoFactorEnable {
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s.settingService.SetTwoFactorEnable(false)
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s.settingService.SetTwoFactorToken("")
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}
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return db.Model(model.User{}).
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Where("id = ?", id).
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Updates(map[string]any{
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"username": username,
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"password": hashedPassword,
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"login_epoch": gorm.Expr("login_epoch + 1"),
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}).
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Error
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}
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func (s *UserService) UpdateFirstUser(username string, password string) error {
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if username == "" {
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return errors.New("username can not be empty")
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} else if password == "" {
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return errors.New("password can not be empty")
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}
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hashedPassword, er := crypto.HashPasswordAsBcrypt(password)
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if er != nil {
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return er
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}
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db := database.GetDB()
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user := &model.User{}
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err := db.Model(model.User{}).First(user).Error
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if database.IsNotFound(err) {
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user.Username = username
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user.Password = hashedPassword
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return db.Model(model.User{}).Create(user).Error
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} else if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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user.Username = username
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user.Password = hashedPassword
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user.LoginEpoch++
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return db.Save(user).Error
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}
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