Files
trihuy-russian/web/service/user.go
T
Farhad H. P. Shirvan 428f1333ac Security hardening: sessions, SSRF, CSP nonce, CSRF logout, trusted proxies (#4275)
* refactor(session): store user ID in session instead of full struct

Replaces storing the full User object in the session cookie with just
the user ID. GetLoginUser now re-fetches the user from the database on
every request so credential/permission changes take effect immediately
without requiring a re-login. Includes a backward-compatible migration
path for existing sessions that still carry the old struct payload.

* feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change

checkLogin middleware now detects default admin/admin credentials and
redirects every panel route to /panel/settings until they are changed.
The settings page auto-opens the Authentication tab, shows a
non-dismissible error banner, and lists 'Default credentials' first in
the security checklist. Login response includes mustChangeCredentials
so the login page can redirect directly. Logout is now POST-only.
Password must be at least 10 characters and cannot be admin/admin.

* feat(settings): redact secrets in AllSettingView and add TrustedProxyCIDRs

Introduces AllSettingView which strips tgBotToken, twoFactorToken,
ldapPassword, apiToken and warp/nord secrets before sending them to
the browser, replacing them with boolean hasFoo presence flags. A new
/panel/setting/secret endpoint allows updating individual secrets by
key. Secrets that arrive blank on a save are preserved from the DB
rather than overwritten. Adds TrustedProxyCIDRs as a configurable
setting (defaults to localhost CIDRs). URL fields are validated before
save.

* fix(security): SSRF prevention, trusted-proxy header gating, CSP nonce, HTTP timeouts

Adds SanitizeHTTPURL / SanitizePublicHTTPURL to reject private-range
and loopback targets before any outbound HTTP request (node probe,
xray download, outbound test, external traffic inform, tgbot API
server, panel updater). Forwarded headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For,
X-Forwarded-Host) are now only trusted when the direct connection
arrives from a CIDR in TrustedProxyCIDRs. CSP policy is tightened with
a per-request nonce. HTTP server gains read/write/idle timeouts. Panel
updater downloads the script to a temp file instead of piping curl into
shell. Xray archive download adds a size cap and response-code check.
backuptotgbot is changed from GET to POST.

* feat(nodes): add allow-private-address toggle per node

Adds AllowPrivateAddress to the Node model (DB default false). When
enabled it bypasses the SSRF private-range check for that node's probe
URL, allowing nodes hosted on RFC-1918 or loopback addresses (e.g.
a private VPN or LAN setup).

* chore: frontend UX improvements, CI pipeline, and dev tooling

- AppSidebar: logout via POST /logout instead of navigating to GET
- InboundList: persist filter state (search, protocol, node) to
  localStorage across page reloads; add protocol and node filter dropdowns
- IndexPage: add health status strip (Xray, CPU, Memory, Update) with
  quick-action buttons
- dependabot: weekly go mod and npm update schedule
- ci.yml: add GitHub Actions workflow for build and vet
- .nvmrc: pin Node 22 for local development
- frontend: bump package.json and package-lock.json
- SubPage, DnsPresetsModal, api-docs: minor fixes

* fix(ci): stub web/dist before go list to satisfy go:embed at compile time

* chore(ui): remove health-strip bar from dashboard top

* Revert "feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change"

This reverts commit 56ce6073ce09f08147f989858e0e88b3a4359546.

* fix(auth): make logout POST+CSRF and propagate session loss to other tabs

- Switch /logout from GET to POST with CSRFMiddleware so it matches the
  SPA's existing HttpUtil.post('/logout') call (previously 404'd silently)
  and blocks GET-based logout via image tags or link prefetchers. Handler
  now returns JSON; the SPA already navigates client-side.
- Return 401 (instead of 404) from /panel/api/* when the caller is a
  browser XHR (X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest) so the axios interceptor
  redirects to the login page on logout-in-another-tab, cookie expiry,
  and server restart. Anonymous callers still get 404 to keep endpoints
  hidden from casual scanners.
- One-shot the 401 redirect in axios-init.js and hang the rejected
  promise so queued polls don't stack reloads or surface error toasts
  while the browser is navigating away.
- Add the CSP nonce to the runtime-injected <script> in dist.go so the
  panel loads under the existing script-src 'nonce-...' policy.
- Update api-docs endpoints.js: GET /logout doc entry was missing.

* fix(settings): POST /logout after credential change

* fix(auth): invalidate other sessions when credentials change

When the admin changes username/password from one machine, sessions
on every other machine kept working until they manually logged out
because session storage is a signed client-side cookie — there is
no server-side session list to revoke.

Add a per-user LoginEpoch counter stamped into the session at login
and re-verified on every authenticated request. UpdateUser and
UpdateFirstUser bump the epoch (UpdateUser via gorm.Expr so a single
update statement is atomic), so any cookie issued before the change
no longer matches the user's current epoch and GetLoginUser returns
nil — the SPA's 401 interceptor then redirects to the login page.

Backward compatible: the column defaults to 0 and missing cookie
values are treated as 0, so sessions issued before this change
remain valid until the first credential update.

---------

Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
2026-05-13 12:52:52 +02:00

160 lines
3.9 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"errors"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/database"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/database/model"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/logger"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/util/crypto"
ldaputil "github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/util/ldap"
"github.com/xlzd/gotp"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// UserService provides business logic for user management and authentication.
// It handles user creation, login, password management, and 2FA operations.
type UserService struct {
settingService SettingService
}
// GetFirstUser retrieves the first user from the database.
// This is typically used for initial setup or when there's only one admin user.
func (s *UserService) GetFirstUser() (*model.User, error) {
db := database.GetDB()
user := &model.User{}
err := db.Model(model.User{}).
First(user).
Error
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return user, nil
}
func (s *UserService) CheckUser(username string, password string, twoFactorCode string) (*model.User, error) {
db := database.GetDB()
user := &model.User{}
err := db.Model(model.User{}).
Where("username = ?", username).
First(user).
Error
if err == gorm.ErrRecordNotFound {
return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
} else if err != nil {
logger.Warning("check user err:", err)
return nil, err
}
if !crypto.CheckPasswordHash(user.Password, password) {
ldapEnabled, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapEnable()
if !ldapEnabled {
return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
}
host, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapHost()
port, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapPort()
useTLS, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapUseTLS()
bindDN, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapBindDN()
ldapPass, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapPassword()
baseDN, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapBaseDN()
userFilter, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapUserFilter()
userAttr, _ := s.settingService.GetLdapUserAttr()
cfg := ldaputil.Config{
Host: host,
Port: port,
UseTLS: useTLS,
BindDN: bindDN,
Password: ldapPass,
BaseDN: baseDN,
UserFilter: userFilter,
UserAttr: userAttr,
}
ok, err := ldaputil.AuthenticateUser(cfg, username, password)
if err != nil || !ok {
return nil, errors.New("invalid credentials")
}
}
twoFactorEnable, err := s.settingService.GetTwoFactorEnable()
if err != nil {
logger.Warning("check two factor err:", err)
return nil, err
}
if twoFactorEnable {
twoFactorToken, err := s.settingService.GetTwoFactorToken()
if err != nil {
logger.Warning("check two factor token err:", err)
return nil, err
}
if gotp.NewDefaultTOTP(twoFactorToken).Now() != twoFactorCode {
return nil, errors.New("invalid 2fa code")
}
}
return user, nil
}
func (s *UserService) UpdateUser(id int, username string, password string) error {
db := database.GetDB()
hashedPassword, err := crypto.HashPasswordAsBcrypt(password)
if err != nil {
return err
}
twoFactorEnable, err := s.settingService.GetTwoFactorEnable()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if twoFactorEnable {
s.settingService.SetTwoFactorEnable(false)
s.settingService.SetTwoFactorToken("")
}
return db.Model(model.User{}).
Where("id = ?", id).
Updates(map[string]any{
"username": username,
"password": hashedPassword,
"login_epoch": gorm.Expr("login_epoch + 1"),
}).
Error
}
func (s *UserService) UpdateFirstUser(username string, password string) error {
if username == "" {
return errors.New("username can not be empty")
} else if password == "" {
return errors.New("password can not be empty")
}
hashedPassword, er := crypto.HashPasswordAsBcrypt(password)
if er != nil {
return er
}
db := database.GetDB()
user := &model.User{}
err := db.Model(model.User{}).First(user).Error
if database.IsNotFound(err) {
user.Username = username
user.Password = hashedPassword
return db.Model(model.User{}).Create(user).Error
} else if err != nil {
return err
}
user.Username = username
user.Password = hashedPassword
user.LoginEpoch++
return db.Save(user).Error
}