Files
trihuy-russian/web/service/node.go
T
Farhad H. P. Shirvan 428f1333ac Security hardening: sessions, SSRF, CSP nonce, CSRF logout, trusted proxies (#4275)
* refactor(session): store user ID in session instead of full struct

Replaces storing the full User object in the session cookie with just
the user ID. GetLoginUser now re-fetches the user from the database on
every request so credential/permission changes take effect immediately
without requiring a re-login. Includes a backward-compatible migration
path for existing sessions that still carry the old struct payload.

* feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change

checkLogin middleware now detects default admin/admin credentials and
redirects every panel route to /panel/settings until they are changed.
The settings page auto-opens the Authentication tab, shows a
non-dismissible error banner, and lists 'Default credentials' first in
the security checklist. Login response includes mustChangeCredentials
so the login page can redirect directly. Logout is now POST-only.
Password must be at least 10 characters and cannot be admin/admin.

* feat(settings): redact secrets in AllSettingView and add TrustedProxyCIDRs

Introduces AllSettingView which strips tgBotToken, twoFactorToken,
ldapPassword, apiToken and warp/nord secrets before sending them to
the browser, replacing them with boolean hasFoo presence flags. A new
/panel/setting/secret endpoint allows updating individual secrets by
key. Secrets that arrive blank on a save are preserved from the DB
rather than overwritten. Adds TrustedProxyCIDRs as a configurable
setting (defaults to localhost CIDRs). URL fields are validated before
save.

* fix(security): SSRF prevention, trusted-proxy header gating, CSP nonce, HTTP timeouts

Adds SanitizeHTTPURL / SanitizePublicHTTPURL to reject private-range
and loopback targets before any outbound HTTP request (node probe,
xray download, outbound test, external traffic inform, tgbot API
server, panel updater). Forwarded headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For,
X-Forwarded-Host) are now only trusted when the direct connection
arrives from a CIDR in TrustedProxyCIDRs. CSP policy is tightened with
a per-request nonce. HTTP server gains read/write/idle timeouts. Panel
updater downloads the script to a temp file instead of piping curl into
shell. Xray archive download adds a size cap and response-code check.
backuptotgbot is changed from GET to POST.

* feat(nodes): add allow-private-address toggle per node

Adds AllowPrivateAddress to the Node model (DB default false). When
enabled it bypasses the SSRF private-range check for that node's probe
URL, allowing nodes hosted on RFC-1918 or loopback addresses (e.g.
a private VPN or LAN setup).

* chore: frontend UX improvements, CI pipeline, and dev tooling

- AppSidebar: logout via POST /logout instead of navigating to GET
- InboundList: persist filter state (search, protocol, node) to
  localStorage across page reloads; add protocol and node filter dropdowns
- IndexPage: add health status strip (Xray, CPU, Memory, Update) with
  quick-action buttons
- dependabot: weekly go mod and npm update schedule
- ci.yml: add GitHub Actions workflow for build and vet
- .nvmrc: pin Node 22 for local development
- frontend: bump package.json and package-lock.json
- SubPage, DnsPresetsModal, api-docs: minor fixes

* fix(ci): stub web/dist before go list to satisfy go:embed at compile time

* chore(ui): remove health-strip bar from dashboard top

* Revert "feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change"

This reverts commit 56ce6073ce09f08147f989858e0e88b3a4359546.

* fix(auth): make logout POST+CSRF and propagate session loss to other tabs

- Switch /logout from GET to POST with CSRFMiddleware so it matches the
  SPA's existing HttpUtil.post('/logout') call (previously 404'd silently)
  and blocks GET-based logout via image tags or link prefetchers. Handler
  now returns JSON; the SPA already navigates client-side.
- Return 401 (instead of 404) from /panel/api/* when the caller is a
  browser XHR (X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest) so the axios interceptor
  redirects to the login page on logout-in-another-tab, cookie expiry,
  and server restart. Anonymous callers still get 404 to keep endpoints
  hidden from casual scanners.
- One-shot the 401 redirect in axios-init.js and hang the rejected
  promise so queued polls don't stack reloads or surface error toasts
  while the browser is navigating away.
- Add the CSP nonce to the runtime-injected <script> in dist.go so the
  panel loads under the existing script-src 'nonce-...' policy.
- Update api-docs endpoints.js: GET /logout doc entry was missing.

* fix(settings): POST /logout after credential change

* fix(auth): invalidate other sessions when credentials change

When the admin changes username/password from one machine, sessions
on every other machine kept working until they manually logged out
because session storage is a signed client-side cookie — there is
no server-side session list to revoke.

Add a per-user LoginEpoch counter stamped into the session at login
and re-verified on every authenticated request. UpdateUser and
UpdateFirstUser bump the epoch (UpdateUser via gorm.Expr so a single
update statement is atomic), so any cookie issued before the change
no longer matches the user's current epoch and GetLoginUser returns
nil — the SPA's 401 interceptor then redirects to the login page.

Backward compatible: the column defaults to 0 and missing cookie
values are treated as 0, so sessions issued before this change
remain valid until the first credential update.

---------

Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
2026-05-13 12:52:52 +02:00

264 lines
6.7 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/database"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/database/model"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/util/common"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/web/runtime"
)
type HeartbeatPatch struct {
Status string
LastHeartbeat int64
LatencyMs int
XrayVersion string
CpuPct float64
MemPct float64
UptimeSecs uint64
LastError string
}
type NodeService struct{}
var nodeHTTPClient = &http.Client{
Transport: &http.Transport{
MaxIdleConns: 64,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 4,
IdleConnTimeout: 60 * time.Second,
},
}
func (s *NodeService) GetAll() ([]*model.Node, error) {
db := database.GetDB()
var nodes []*model.Node
err := db.Model(model.Node{}).Order("id asc").Find(&nodes).Error
return nodes, err
}
func (s *NodeService) GetById(id int) (*model.Node, error) {
db := database.GetDB()
n := &model.Node{}
if err := db.Model(model.Node{}).Where("id = ?", id).First(n).Error; err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return n, nil
}
func normalizeBasePath(p string) string {
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
if p == "" {
return "/"
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "/") {
p = "/" + p
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(p, "/") {
p = p + "/"
}
return p
}
func (s *NodeService) normalize(n *model.Node) error {
n.Name = strings.TrimSpace(n.Name)
n.Address = strings.TrimSpace(n.Address)
n.ApiToken = strings.TrimSpace(n.ApiToken)
if n.Name == "" {
return common.NewError("node name is required")
}
if n.Address == "" {
return common.NewError("node address is required")
}
if n.Port <= 0 || n.Port > 65535 {
return common.NewError("node port must be 1-65535")
}
if n.Scheme != "http" && n.Scheme != "https" {
n.Scheme = "https"
}
n.BasePath = normalizeBasePath(n.BasePath)
return nil
}
func (s *NodeService) Create(n *model.Node) error {
if err := s.normalize(n); err != nil {
return err
}
db := database.GetDB()
return db.Create(n).Error
}
func (s *NodeService) Update(id int, in *model.Node) error {
if err := s.normalize(in); err != nil {
return err
}
db := database.GetDB()
existing := &model.Node{}
if err := db.Where("id = ?", id).First(existing).Error; err != nil {
return err
}
updates := map[string]any{
"name": in.Name,
"remark": in.Remark,
"scheme": in.Scheme,
"address": in.Address,
"port": in.Port,
"base_path": in.BasePath,
"api_token": in.ApiToken,
"enable": in.Enable,
"allow_private_address": in.AllowPrivateAddress,
}
if err := db.Model(model.Node{}).Where("id = ?", id).Updates(updates).Error; err != nil {
return err
}
if mgr := runtime.GetManager(); mgr != nil {
mgr.InvalidateNode(id)
}
return nil
}
func (s *NodeService) Delete(id int) error {
db := database.GetDB()
if err := db.Where("id = ?", id).Delete(model.Node{}).Error; err != nil {
return err
}
if mgr := runtime.GetManager(); mgr != nil {
mgr.InvalidateNode(id)
}
nodeMetrics.drop(nodeMetricKey(id, "cpu"))
nodeMetrics.drop(nodeMetricKey(id, "mem"))
return nil
}
func (s *NodeService) SetEnable(id int, enable bool) error {
db := database.GetDB()
return db.Model(model.Node{}).Where("id = ?", id).Update("enable", enable).Error
}
func (s *NodeService) UpdateHeartbeat(id int, p HeartbeatPatch) error {
db := database.GetDB()
updates := map[string]any{
"status": p.Status,
"last_heartbeat": p.LastHeartbeat,
"latency_ms": p.LatencyMs,
"xray_version": p.XrayVersion,
"cpu_pct": p.CpuPct,
"mem_pct": p.MemPct,
"uptime_secs": p.UptimeSecs,
"last_error": p.LastError,
}
if err := db.Model(model.Node{}).Where("id = ?", id).Updates(updates).Error; err != nil {
return err
}
if p.Status == "online" {
now := time.Unix(p.LastHeartbeat, 0)
nodeMetrics.append(nodeMetricKey(id, "cpu"), now, p.CpuPct)
nodeMetrics.append(nodeMetricKey(id, "mem"), now, p.MemPct)
}
return nil
}
func nodeMetricKey(id int, metric string) string {
return "node:" + strconv.Itoa(id) + ":" + metric
}
func (s *NodeService) AggregateNodeMetric(id int, metric string, bucketSeconds int, maxPoints int) []map[string]any {
return nodeMetrics.aggregate(nodeMetricKey(id, metric), bucketSeconds, maxPoints)
}
func (s *NodeService) Probe(ctx context.Context, n *model.Node) (HeartbeatPatch, error) {
patch := HeartbeatPatch{LastHeartbeat: time.Now().Unix()}
url := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s:%d%spanel/api/server/status",
n.Scheme, n.Address, n.Port, normalizeBasePath(n.BasePath))
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
if err != nil {
patch.LastError = err.Error()
return patch, err
}
if n.ApiToken != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+n.ApiToken)
}
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
start := time.Now()
resp, err := nodeHTTPClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
patch.LastError = err.Error()
return patch, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
patch.LatencyMs = int(time.Since(start) / time.Millisecond)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
patch.LastError = fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d from remote panel", resp.StatusCode)
return patch, errors.New(patch.LastError)
}
var envelope struct {
Success bool `json:"success"`
Msg string `json:"msg"`
Obj *struct {
CpuPct float64 `json:"cpu"`
Mem struct {
Current uint64 `json:"current"`
Total uint64 `json:"total"`
} `json:"mem"`
Xray struct {
Version string `json:"version"`
} `json:"xray"`
Uptime uint64 `json:"uptime"`
} `json:"obj"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&envelope); err != nil {
patch.LastError = "decode response: " + err.Error()
return patch, err
}
if !envelope.Success || envelope.Obj == nil {
patch.LastError = "remote returned success=false: " + envelope.Msg
return patch, errors.New(patch.LastError)
}
o := envelope.Obj
patch.CpuPct = o.CpuPct
if o.Mem.Total > 0 {
patch.MemPct = float64(o.Mem.Current) * 100.0 / float64(o.Mem.Total)
}
patch.XrayVersion = o.Xray.Version
patch.UptimeSecs = o.Uptime
return patch, nil
}
type ProbeResultUI struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
LatencyMs int `json:"latencyMs"`
XrayVersion string `json:"xrayVersion"`
CpuPct float64 `json:"cpuPct"`
MemPct float64 `json:"memPct"`
UptimeSecs uint64 `json:"uptimeSecs"`
Error string `json:"error"`
}
func (p HeartbeatPatch) ToUI(ok bool) ProbeResultUI {
r := ProbeResultUI{
LatencyMs: p.LatencyMs,
XrayVersion: p.XrayVersion,
CpuPct: p.CpuPct,
MemPct: p.MemPct,
UptimeSecs: p.UptimeSecs,
Error: p.LastError,
}
if ok {
r.Status = "online"
} else {
r.Status = "offline"
}
return r
}