Files
trihuy-russian/web/controller/index.go
T
Farhad H. P. Shirvan 428f1333ac Security hardening: sessions, SSRF, CSP nonce, CSRF logout, trusted proxies (#4275)
* refactor(session): store user ID in session instead of full struct

Replaces storing the full User object in the session cookie with just
the user ID. GetLoginUser now re-fetches the user from the database on
every request so credential/permission changes take effect immediately
without requiring a re-login. Includes a backward-compatible migration
path for existing sessions that still carry the old struct payload.

* feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change

checkLogin middleware now detects default admin/admin credentials and
redirects every panel route to /panel/settings until they are changed.
The settings page auto-opens the Authentication tab, shows a
non-dismissible error banner, and lists 'Default credentials' first in
the security checklist. Login response includes mustChangeCredentials
so the login page can redirect directly. Logout is now POST-only.
Password must be at least 10 characters and cannot be admin/admin.

* feat(settings): redact secrets in AllSettingView and add TrustedProxyCIDRs

Introduces AllSettingView which strips tgBotToken, twoFactorToken,
ldapPassword, apiToken and warp/nord secrets before sending them to
the browser, replacing them with boolean hasFoo presence flags. A new
/panel/setting/secret endpoint allows updating individual secrets by
key. Secrets that arrive blank on a save are preserved from the DB
rather than overwritten. Adds TrustedProxyCIDRs as a configurable
setting (defaults to localhost CIDRs). URL fields are validated before
save.

* fix(security): SSRF prevention, trusted-proxy header gating, CSP nonce, HTTP timeouts

Adds SanitizeHTTPURL / SanitizePublicHTTPURL to reject private-range
and loopback targets before any outbound HTTP request (node probe,
xray download, outbound test, external traffic inform, tgbot API
server, panel updater). Forwarded headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For,
X-Forwarded-Host) are now only trusted when the direct connection
arrives from a CIDR in TrustedProxyCIDRs. CSP policy is tightened with
a per-request nonce. HTTP server gains read/write/idle timeouts. Panel
updater downloads the script to a temp file instead of piping curl into
shell. Xray archive download adds a size cap and response-code check.
backuptotgbot is changed from GET to POST.

* feat(nodes): add allow-private-address toggle per node

Adds AllowPrivateAddress to the Node model (DB default false). When
enabled it bypasses the SSRF private-range check for that node's probe
URL, allowing nodes hosted on RFC-1918 or loopback addresses (e.g.
a private VPN or LAN setup).

* chore: frontend UX improvements, CI pipeline, and dev tooling

- AppSidebar: logout via POST /logout instead of navigating to GET
- InboundList: persist filter state (search, protocol, node) to
  localStorage across page reloads; add protocol and node filter dropdowns
- IndexPage: add health status strip (Xray, CPU, Memory, Update) with
  quick-action buttons
- dependabot: weekly go mod and npm update schedule
- ci.yml: add GitHub Actions workflow for build and vet
- .nvmrc: pin Node 22 for local development
- frontend: bump package.json and package-lock.json
- SubPage, DnsPresetsModal, api-docs: minor fixes

* fix(ci): stub web/dist before go list to satisfy go:embed at compile time

* chore(ui): remove health-strip bar from dashboard top

* Revert "feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change"

This reverts commit 56ce6073ce09f08147f989858e0e88b3a4359546.

* fix(auth): make logout POST+CSRF and propagate session loss to other tabs

- Switch /logout from GET to POST with CSRFMiddleware so it matches the
  SPA's existing HttpUtil.post('/logout') call (previously 404'd silently)
  and blocks GET-based logout via image tags or link prefetchers. Handler
  now returns JSON; the SPA already navigates client-side.
- Return 401 (instead of 404) from /panel/api/* when the caller is a
  browser XHR (X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest) so the axios interceptor
  redirects to the login page on logout-in-another-tab, cookie expiry,
  and server restart. Anonymous callers still get 404 to keep endpoints
  hidden from casual scanners.
- One-shot the 401 redirect in axios-init.js and hang the rejected
  promise so queued polls don't stack reloads or surface error toasts
  while the browser is navigating away.
- Add the CSP nonce to the runtime-injected <script> in dist.go so the
  panel loads under the existing script-src 'nonce-...' policy.
- Update api-docs endpoints.js: GET /logout doc entry was missing.

* fix(settings): POST /logout after credential change

* fix(auth): invalidate other sessions when credentials change

When the admin changes username/password from one machine, sessions
on every other machine kept working until they manually logged out
because session storage is a signed client-side cookie — there is
no server-side session list to revoke.

Add a per-user LoginEpoch counter stamped into the session at login
and re-verified on every authenticated request. UpdateUser and
UpdateFirstUser bump the epoch (UpdateUser via gorm.Expr so a single
update statement is atomic), so any cookie issued before the change
no longer matches the user's current epoch and GetLoginUser returns
nil — the SPA's 401 interceptor then redirects to the login page.

Backward compatible: the column defaults to 0 and missing cookie
values are treated as 0, so sessions issued before this change
remain valid until the first credential update.

---------

Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
2026-05-13 12:52:52 +02:00

169 lines
5.3 KiB
Go

package controller
import (
"net/http"
"text/template"
"time"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/logger"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/web/middleware"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/web/service"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/web/session"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// LoginForm represents the login request structure.
type LoginForm struct {
Username string `json:"username" form:"username"`
Password string `json:"password" form:"password"`
TwoFactorCode string `json:"twoFactorCode" form:"twoFactorCode"`
}
// IndexController handles the main index and login-related routes.
type IndexController struct {
BaseController
settingService service.SettingService
userService service.UserService
tgbot service.Tgbot
}
// NewIndexController creates a new IndexController and initializes its routes.
func NewIndexController(g *gin.RouterGroup) *IndexController {
a := &IndexController{}
a.initRouter(g)
return a
}
// initRouter sets up the routes for index, login, logout, and two-factor authentication.
func (a *IndexController) initRouter(g *gin.RouterGroup) {
g.GET("/", a.index)
g.GET("/csrf-token", a.csrfToken)
g.POST("/login", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(), a.login)
g.POST("/logout", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(), a.logout)
g.POST("/getTwoFactorEnable", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(), a.getTwoFactorEnable)
}
// index handles the root route, redirecting logged-in users to the panel or showing the login page.
func (a *IndexController) index(c *gin.Context) {
if session.IsLogin(c) {
c.Header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
c.Redirect(http.StatusTemporaryRedirect, c.GetString("base_path")+"panel/")
return
}
serveDistPage(c, "login.html")
}
// login handles user authentication and session creation.
func (a *IndexController) login(c *gin.Context) {
var form LoginForm
if err := c.ShouldBind(&form); err != nil {
pureJsonMsg(c, http.StatusOK, false, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.invalidFormData"))
return
}
if form.Username == "" {
pureJsonMsg(c, http.StatusOK, false, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.emptyUsername"))
return
}
if form.Password == "" {
pureJsonMsg(c, http.StatusOK, false, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.emptyPassword"))
return
}
remoteIP := getRemoteIp(c)
safeUser := template.HTMLEscapeString(form.Username)
timeStr := time.Now().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")
if blockedUntil, ok := defaultLoginLimiter.allow(remoteIP, form.Username); !ok {
reason := "too many failed attempts"
logger.Warningf("failed login: username=%q, IP=%q, reason=%q, blocked_until=%s", safeUser, remoteIP, reason, blockedUntil.Format(time.RFC3339))
a.tgbot.UserLoginNotify(service.LoginAttempt{
Username: safeUser,
IP: remoteIP,
Time: timeStr,
Status: service.LoginFail,
Reason: reason,
})
pureJsonMsg(c, http.StatusOK, false, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.wrongUsernameOrPassword"))
return
}
user, checkErr := a.userService.CheckUser(form.Username, form.Password, form.TwoFactorCode)
if user == nil {
reason := loginFailureReason(checkErr)
if blockedUntil, blocked := defaultLoginLimiter.registerFailure(remoteIP, form.Username); blocked {
logger.Warningf("failed login: username=%q, IP=%q, reason=%q, blocked_until=%s", safeUser, remoteIP, reason, blockedUntil.Format(time.RFC3339))
} else {
logger.Warningf("failed login: username=%q, IP=%q, reason=%q", safeUser, remoteIP, reason)
}
a.tgbot.UserLoginNotify(service.LoginAttempt{
Username: safeUser,
IP: remoteIP,
Time: timeStr,
Status: service.LoginFail,
Reason: reason,
})
pureJsonMsg(c, http.StatusOK, false, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.wrongUsernameOrPassword"))
return
}
defaultLoginLimiter.registerSuccess(remoteIP, form.Username)
logger.Infof("%s logged in successfully, Ip Address: %s\n", safeUser, remoteIP)
a.tgbot.UserLoginNotify(service.LoginAttempt{
Username: safeUser,
IP: remoteIP,
Time: timeStr,
Status: service.LoginSuccess,
})
if err := session.SetLoginUser(c, user); err != nil {
logger.Warning("Unable to save session:", err)
return
}
logger.Infof("%s logged in successfully", safeUser)
jsonMsg(c, I18nWeb(c, "pages.login.toasts.successLogin"), nil)
}
func loginFailureReason(err error) string {
if err != nil && err.Error() == "invalid 2fa code" {
return "invalid 2FA code"
}
return "invalid credentials"
}
// logout clears the session. The SPA performs the navigation client-side.
func (a *IndexController) logout(c *gin.Context) {
user := session.GetLoginUser(c)
if user != nil {
logger.Infof("%s logged out successfully", user.Username)
}
if err := session.ClearSession(c); err != nil {
logger.Warning("Unable to clear session on logout:", err)
}
c.Header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"success": true})
}
// csrfToken returns the session CSRF token. Public — the login page
// needs a token before authenticating.
func (a *IndexController) csrfToken(c *gin.Context) {
token, err := session.EnsureCSRFToken(c)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"success": false, "msg": err.Error()})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"success": true, "obj": token})
}
// getTwoFactorEnable retrieves the current status of two-factor authentication.
func (a *IndexController) getTwoFactorEnable(c *gin.Context) {
status, err := a.settingService.GetTwoFactorEnable()
if err == nil {
jsonObj(c, status, nil)
}
}