38da210ded
The Node.Probe and Remote.do paths built outbound URLs by string-
formatting admin-controlled fields (Scheme/Address/Port/BasePath)
straight into requests, then dialed the result with the default
transport. CodeQL flagged this as go/request-forgery — an admin
(or anyone who compromises the admin account) could point a node
at internal infrastructure (cloud metadata, RFC1918 ranges, etc.)
and the panel would dutifully fetch it.
Add util/netsafe with a shared TOCTOU-safe DialContext that
resolves the host, rejects private/internal IPs unless the
per-request context whitelists them (per-node AllowPrivateAddress
flag, plumbed through context.Value), and dials the resolved IP
directly so the IP that passed the check is the IP we connect to.
This closes the DNS-rebinding window where a hostname could
resolve to a public IP at check time and a private one at dial.
Also tighten address validation (NormalizeHost rejects anything
that isn't a bare hostname or IP literal — no embedded paths,
userinfo, schemes) and switch URL construction from fmt.Sprintf to
url.URL{} + net.JoinHostPort so admin-supplied values can't smuggle
URL components.
custom_geo.go's isBlockedIP now delegates to netsafe so there's
one source of truth.
102 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
102 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
// Package netsafe provides SSRF-safe HTTP dialing primitives. A dialer
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// installed via SSRFGuardedDialContext resolves the host, rejects
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// private/internal IPs unless the per-request context whitelists them,
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// and dials the resolved IP directly so the IP checked is the IP used —
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// closing the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU window.
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package netsafe
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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// IsBlockedIP returns true for loopback, RFC1918 private, link-local
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// (including 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata), and unspecified addresses.
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func IsBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
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return ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
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ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IsUnspecified()
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}
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type allowPrivateCtxKey struct{}
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// ContextWithAllowPrivate marks a context as permitting outbound requests
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// to private/internal IPs. Use only for callers (e.g. LAN-resident nodes)
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// where the admin has opted in explicitly.
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func ContextWithAllowPrivate(ctx context.Context, allow bool) context.Context {
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return context.WithValue(ctx, allowPrivateCtxKey{}, allow)
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}
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func AllowPrivateFromContext(ctx context.Context) bool {
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v, _ := ctx.Value(allowPrivateCtxKey{}).(bool)
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return v
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}
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var defaultDialer = &net.Dialer{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
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// SSRFGuardedDialContext is a net/http Transport.DialContext implementation
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// that enforces IsBlockedIP unless the context opts in via
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// ContextWithAllowPrivate.
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func SSRFGuardedDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
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host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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allowPrivate := AllowPrivateFromContext(ctx)
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var ips []net.IPAddr
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if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
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ips = []net.IPAddr{{IP: ip}}
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} else {
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ips, err = net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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}
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var lastErr error
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for _, ipAddr := range ips {
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if !allowPrivate && IsBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
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lastErr = fmt.Errorf("blocked private/internal address %s", ipAddr.IP)
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continue
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}
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conn, derr := defaultDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ipAddr.IP.String(), port))
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if derr == nil {
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return conn, nil
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}
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lastErr = derr
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}
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if lastErr == nil {
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lastErr = fmt.Errorf("no usable address for %s", host)
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}
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return nil, lastErr
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}
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// hostnamePattern accepts RFC 1123 hostnames (letters, digits, hyphens,
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// dots). Bracketed IPv6 forms ("[::1]") are stripped before this check
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// runs in NormalizeHost.
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var hostnamePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9]([A-Za-z0-9-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?(\.[A-Za-z0-9]([A-Za-z0-9-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?)*$`)
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// NormalizeHost validates that addr is a plain hostname or IP literal with
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// no embedded path/userinfo/port/scheme — anything that could be used to
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// smuggle URL components past callers that string-format URLs from user
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// input. Returns the bare host (no brackets); callers wrap IPv6 via
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// net.JoinHostPort as needed.
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func NormalizeHost(addr string) (string, error) {
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addr = strings.TrimSpace(addr)
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if addr == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("address is required")
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(addr, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(addr, "]") {
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addr = addr[1 : len(addr)-1]
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}
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if ip := net.ParseIP(addr); ip != nil {
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return ip.String(), nil
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}
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if len(addr) > 253 || !hostnamePattern.MatchString(addr) {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid host %q", addr)
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}
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return addr, nil
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}
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