Security hardening: sessions, SSRF, CSP nonce, CSRF logout, trusted proxies (#4275)

* refactor(session): store user ID in session instead of full struct

Replaces storing the full User object in the session cookie with just
the user ID. GetLoginUser now re-fetches the user from the database on
every request so credential/permission changes take effect immediately
without requiring a re-login. Includes a backward-compatible migration
path for existing sessions that still carry the old struct payload.

* feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change

checkLogin middleware now detects default admin/admin credentials and
redirects every panel route to /panel/settings until they are changed.
The settings page auto-opens the Authentication tab, shows a
non-dismissible error banner, and lists 'Default credentials' first in
the security checklist. Login response includes mustChangeCredentials
so the login page can redirect directly. Logout is now POST-only.
Password must be at least 10 characters and cannot be admin/admin.

* feat(settings): redact secrets in AllSettingView and add TrustedProxyCIDRs

Introduces AllSettingView which strips tgBotToken, twoFactorToken,
ldapPassword, apiToken and warp/nord secrets before sending them to
the browser, replacing them with boolean hasFoo presence flags. A new
/panel/setting/secret endpoint allows updating individual secrets by
key. Secrets that arrive blank on a save are preserved from the DB
rather than overwritten. Adds TrustedProxyCIDRs as a configurable
setting (defaults to localhost CIDRs). URL fields are validated before
save.

* fix(security): SSRF prevention, trusted-proxy header gating, CSP nonce, HTTP timeouts

Adds SanitizeHTTPURL / SanitizePublicHTTPURL to reject private-range
and loopback targets before any outbound HTTP request (node probe,
xray download, outbound test, external traffic inform, tgbot API
server, panel updater). Forwarded headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For,
X-Forwarded-Host) are now only trusted when the direct connection
arrives from a CIDR in TrustedProxyCIDRs. CSP policy is tightened with
a per-request nonce. HTTP server gains read/write/idle timeouts. Panel
updater downloads the script to a temp file instead of piping curl into
shell. Xray archive download adds a size cap and response-code check.
backuptotgbot is changed from GET to POST.

* feat(nodes): add allow-private-address toggle per node

Adds AllowPrivateAddress to the Node model (DB default false). When
enabled it bypasses the SSRF private-range check for that node's probe
URL, allowing nodes hosted on RFC-1918 or loopback addresses (e.g.
a private VPN or LAN setup).

* chore: frontend UX improvements, CI pipeline, and dev tooling

- AppSidebar: logout via POST /logout instead of navigating to GET
- InboundList: persist filter state (search, protocol, node) to
  localStorage across page reloads; add protocol and node filter dropdowns
- IndexPage: add health status strip (Xray, CPU, Memory, Update) with
  quick-action buttons
- dependabot: weekly go mod and npm update schedule
- ci.yml: add GitHub Actions workflow for build and vet
- .nvmrc: pin Node 22 for local development
- frontend: bump package.json and package-lock.json
- SubPage, DnsPresetsModal, api-docs: minor fixes

* fix(ci): stub web/dist before go list to satisfy go:embed at compile time

* chore(ui): remove health-strip bar from dashboard top

* Revert "feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change"

This reverts commit 56ce6073ce09f08147f989858e0e88b3a4359546.

* fix(auth): make logout POST+CSRF and propagate session loss to other tabs

- Switch /logout from GET to POST with CSRFMiddleware so it matches the
  SPA's existing HttpUtil.post('/logout') call (previously 404'd silently)
  and blocks GET-based logout via image tags or link prefetchers. Handler
  now returns JSON; the SPA already navigates client-side.
- Return 401 (instead of 404) from /panel/api/* when the caller is a
  browser XHR (X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest) so the axios interceptor
  redirects to the login page on logout-in-another-tab, cookie expiry,
  and server restart. Anonymous callers still get 404 to keep endpoints
  hidden from casual scanners.
- One-shot the 401 redirect in axios-init.js and hang the rejected
  promise so queued polls don't stack reloads or surface error toasts
  while the browser is navigating away.
- Add the CSP nonce to the runtime-injected <script> in dist.go so the
  panel loads under the existing script-src 'nonce-...' policy.
- Update api-docs endpoints.js: GET /logout doc entry was missing.

* fix(settings): POST /logout after credential change

* fix(auth): invalidate other sessions when credentials change

When the admin changes username/password from one machine, sessions
on every other machine kept working until they manually logged out
because session storage is a signed client-side cookie — there is
no server-side session list to revoke.

Add a per-user LoginEpoch counter stamped into the session at login
and re-verified on every authenticated request. UpdateUser and
UpdateFirstUser bump the epoch (UpdateUser via gorm.Expr so a single
update statement is atomic), so any cookie issued before the change
no longer matches the user's current epoch and GetLoginUser returns
nil — the SPA's 401 interceptor then redirects to the login page.

Backward compatible: the column defaults to 0 and missing cookie
values are treated as 0, so sessions issued before this change
remain valid until the first credential update.

---------

Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>

web/controller/api.go

@@ -29,25 +29,11 @@ func NewAPIController(g *gin.RouterGroup, customGeo *service.CustomGeoService) *
 	return a
 }
 
-// checkAPIAuth is a middleware that returns 404 for unauthenticated API requests
-// to hide the existence of API endpoints from unauthorized users.
-//
-// Two auth paths are accepted:
-//  1. Authorization: Bearer <apiToken> — used by remote central panels
-//     polling this instance as a node. Matches via constant-time compare.
-//     Sets c.Set("api_authed", true) so CSRFMiddleware can short-circuit.
-//  2. Existing session cookie — used by browsers logged into the panel UI.
-//
-// Anything else falls through to a 404 so the API endpoints remain hidden.
 func (a *APIController) checkAPIAuth(c *gin.Context) {
 	auth := c.GetHeader("Authorization")
 	if strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
 		tok := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
 		if a.settingService.MatchApiToken(tok) {
-			// Handlers like InboundController.addInbound assume a logged-in
-			// user (inbound.UserId = user.Id). Bearer callers have no
-			// session, so attach the first user as a fallback. Single-user
-			// panels are the norm here.
 			if u, err := a.userService.GetFirstUser(); err == nil {
 				session.SetAPIAuthUser(c, u)
 			}
@@ -57,7 +43,11 @@ func (a *APIController) checkAPIAuth(c *gin.Context) {
 		}
 	}
 	if !session.IsLogin(c) {
-		c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusNotFound)
+		if c.GetHeader("X-Requested-With") == "XMLHttpRequest" {
+			c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		} else {
+			c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusNotFound)
+		}
 		return
 	}
 	c.Next()
@@ -85,7 +75,7 @@ func (a *APIController) initRouter(g *gin.RouterGroup, customGeo *service.Custom
 	NewCustomGeoController(api.Group("/custom-geo"), customGeo)
 
 	// Extra routes
-	api.GET("/backuptotgbot", a.BackuptoTgbot)
+	api.POST("/backuptotgbot", a.BackuptoTgbot)
 }
 
 // BackuptoTgbot sends a backup of the panel data to Telegram bot admins.