Files
Xray-core/proxy/tun/tun_windows_wfp.go
T
patternihaandClaude Opus 5.5 2db099b34b TUN inbound: Block DNS and IPv6 leaks outside the TUN on Windows; Add strictRoute
Windows sends name queries to the DNS servers of all interfaces, and a
resolver on the local network (e.g. 192.168.1.1 from DHCP) is reached
through its more specific LAN route instead of the TUN, so DNS leaks
past it. IPv6 bypasses a TUN that cannot carry it.

With autoSystemRoutingTable set, the Windows TUN now adds Windows
Filtering Platform filters, all in one transaction and in a dynamic
session, so that they are removed when Xray exits, even if it crashes:
- DNS (port 53) only goes through the TUN, in both directions: its local
  address, and the interface it leaves or arrives by, must be the TUN's.
- IPv6 is blocked in both directions when the TUN has no IPv6 address or
  no IPv6 route, except loopback, neighbor and multicast listener
  discovery, and DHCPv6.
- Xray's own traffic is exempt: its connections out with a hard permit,
  which Windows Firewall rules do not override (like sing-box's
  strict_route), connections to its inbounds with an ordinary one.
If the filters cannot be added, the TUN does not start on Windows 10 and
later (only a warning on 7/8). The new `strictRoute` option (true by
default) turns them off.

Also on Windows:
- A warning for `dns` servers outside gateway and autoSystemRoutingTable,
  as queries to them cannot go through the TUN and are blocked.
- While DNS is restricted and autoOutboundsInterface is in use, Xray
  resolves the names it would ask Windows for itself (Go's resolver on
  its own sockets). Those lookups and the `localhost` DNS server skip the
  TUN's DNS servers, unless another interface uses them too, instead of
  looping back into the TUN.
- The DNS cache is flushed when the TUN starts and stops, and DNS
  registration is turned off on the TUN (through netsh before Windows 10
  1809).
- Close no longer panics when registering the route or interface change
  callbacks failed.
The README's Windows section describes all of it.

Tested on Windows 11, elevated, amd64 and 386: the filters, DNS arriving
through a real Wintun adapter and blocked outside it, the IPv6 block,
Windows Firewall rules, and a real Xray run. Windows 7/8 and Windows 10
before 1809 are untested.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 08:15:40 +03:30

396 lines
16 KiB
Go

//go:build windows
package tun
import (
"net/netip"
"os"
"runtime"
"slices"
"unsafe"
"github.com/xtls/xray-core/common/errors"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows/tunnel/winipcfg"
)
var (
modfwpuclnt = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("fwpuclnt.dll")
moddnsapi = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("dnsapi.dll")
procFwpmEngineOpen0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmEngineOpen0")
procFwpmEngineClose0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmEngineClose0")
procFwpmTransactionBegin0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmTransactionBegin0")
procFwpmTransactionCommit0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmTransactionCommit0")
procFwpmTransactionAbort0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmTransactionAbort0")
procFwpmSubLayerAdd0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmSubLayerAdd0")
procFwpmFilterAdd0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmFilterAdd0")
procFwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0")
procFwpmFreeMemory0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmFreeMemory0")
procDnsFlushResolverCache = moddnsapi.NewProc("DnsFlushResolverCache")
)
// fwptypes.h and fwpmtypes.h
const (
rpcCAuthnWinNT = 10 // RPC_C_AUTHN_WINNT
fwpmSessionFlagDynamic = 1 // FWPM_SESSION_FLAG_DYNAMIC
fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight = 8 // FWPM_FILTER_FLAG_CLEAR_ACTION_RIGHT
fwpUint8 = 1 // FWP_UINT8
fwpUint16 = 2 // FWP_UINT16
fwpUint32 = 3 // FWP_UINT32
fwpUint64 = 4 // FWP_UINT64
fwpByteArray16Type = 11 // FWP_BYTE_ARRAY16_TYPE
fwpByteBlobType = 12 // FWP_BYTE_BLOB_TYPE
fwpMatchEqual = 0 // FWP_MATCH_EQUAL
fwpMatchFlagsAllSet = 6 // FWP_MATCH_FLAGS_ALL_SET
fwpConditionFlagIsLoopback = 1 // FWP_CONDITION_FLAG_IS_LOOPBACK
fwpActionBlock = 0x1001 // FWP_ACTION_BLOCK
fwpActionPermit = 0x1002 // FWP_ACTION_PERMIT
)
// fwpmu.h
var (
fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV4 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xc38d57d1, Data2: 0x05a7, Data3: 0x4c33, Data4: [8]byte{0x90, 0x4f, 0x7f, 0xbc, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x0e, 0x82}}
fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV6 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x4a72393b, Data2: 0x319f, Data3: 0x44bc, Data4: [8]byte{0x84, 0xc3, 0xba, 0x54, 0xdc, 0xb3, 0xb6, 0xb4}}
fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV4 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xe1cd9fe7, Data2: 0xf4b5, Data3: 0x4273, Data4: [8]byte{0x96, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x2e, 0x48, 0x7b, 0x86, 0x50}}
fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV6 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xa3b42c97, Data2: 0x9f04, Data3: 0x4672, Data4: [8]byte{0xb8, 0x7e, 0xce, 0xe9, 0xc4, 0x83, 0x25, 0x7f}}
fwpmConditionFlags = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x632ce23b, Data2: 0x5167, Data3: 0x435c, Data4: [8]byte{0x86, 0xd7, 0xe9, 0x03, 0x68, 0x4a, 0xa8, 0x0c}}
fwpmConditionIPArrivalInterface = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x618a9b6d, Data2: 0x386b, Data3: 0x4136, Data4: [8]byte{0xad, 0x6e, 0xb5, 0x15, 0x87, 0xcf, 0xb1, 0xcd}}
fwpmConditionIPLocalInterface = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x4cd62a49, Data2: 0x59c3, Data3: 0x4969, Data4: [8]byte{0xb7, 0xf3, 0xbd, 0xa5, 0xd3, 0x28, 0x90, 0xa4}}
fwpmConditionIPLocalPort = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x0c1ba1af, Data2: 0x5765, Data3: 0x453f, Data4: [8]byte{0xaf, 0x22, 0xa8, 0xf7, 0x91, 0xac, 0x77, 0x5b}} // also FWPM_CONDITION_ICMP_TYPE
fwpmConditionIPNexthopInterface = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x93ae8f5b, Data2: 0x7f6f, Data3: 0x4719, Data4: [8]byte{0x98, 0xc8, 0x14, 0xe9, 0x74, 0x29, 0xef, 0x04}}
fwpmConditionIPProtocol = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x3971ef2b, Data2: 0x623e, Data3: 0x4f9a, Data4: [8]byte{0x8c, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0x79, 0xb8, 0x06, 0xb9, 0xa7}}
fwpmConditionIPRemoteAddress = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xb235ae9a, Data2: 0x1d64, Data3: 0x49b8, Data4: [8]byte{0xa4, 0x4c, 0x5f, 0xf3, 0xd9, 0x09, 0x50, 0x45}}
fwpmConditionIPRemotePort = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xc35a604d, Data2: 0xd22b, Data3: 0x4e1a, Data4: [8]byte{0x91, 0xb4, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x74, 0xee, 0x67, 0x4b}} // also FWPM_CONDITION_ICMP_CODE
fwpmConditionALEAppID = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xd78e1e87, Data2: 0x8644, Data3: 0x4ea5, Data4: [8]byte{0x94, 0x37, 0xd8, 0x09, 0xec, 0xef, 0xc9, 0x71}}
)
// ff02::1:2, where DHCPv6 clients send to. A package-level variable never
// moves, so conditions may refer to it through uintptr.
var ipv6AllDHCPv6Servers = [16]byte{0xff, 0x02, 13: 0x01, 15: 0x02}
type fwpByteBlob struct {
size uint32
data *byte
}
// fwpValue0 is FWP_VALUE0 as well as FWP_CONDITION_VALUE0. Their union holds
// a scalar of at most 32 bits, or a pointer for the larger types.
type fwpValue0 struct {
typ uint32
value uintptr
}
type fwpmDisplayData0 struct {
name *uint16
description *uint16
}
type fwpmSession0 struct {
sessionKey windows.GUID
displayData fwpmDisplayData0
flags uint32
txnWaitTimeoutInMSec uint32
processID uint32
sid *windows.SID
username *uint16
kernelMode int32
}
type fwpmSublayer0 struct {
subLayerKey windows.GUID
displayData fwpmDisplayData0
flags uint32
providerKey *windows.GUID
providerData fwpByteBlob
weight uint16
}
type fwpmFilterCondition0 struct {
fieldKey windows.GUID
matchType uint32
conditionValue fwpValue0
}
type fwpmAction0 struct {
typ uint32
filterType windows.GUID
}
type fwpmFilter0 struct {
filterKey windows.GUID
displayData fwpmDisplayData0
flags uint32
providerKey *windows.GUID
providerData fwpByteBlob
layerKey windows.GUID
subLayerKey windows.GUID
weight fwpValue0
numFilterConditions uint32
filterCondition *fwpmFilterCondition0
action fwpmAction0
_ uint32 // C aligns the following union to 8 bytes, as it holds a UINT64
providerContextKey windows.GUID
reserved *windows.GUID
_ [8 - unsafe.Sizeof(uintptr(0))]byte // and filterId as well, also on 32-bit
filterID uint64
effectiveWeight fwpValue0
}
// fwpmResult converts the DWORD status the Fwpm functions return.
func fwpmResult(r1, _ uintptr, _ error) error {
if r1 != 0 {
return windows.Errno(r1)
}
return nil
}
func utf16Ptr(s string) *uint16 {
p, _ := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(s)
return p
}
func condition(field *windows.GUID, typ uint32, value uintptr) fwpmFilterCondition0 {
return fwpmFilterCondition0{
fieldKey: *field,
matchType: fwpMatchEqual,
conditionValue: fwpValue0{typ: typ, value: value},
}
}
// blockLeaks keeps traffic from leaving through interfaces other than tun,
// for every program but Xray itself, whose outbounds (DNS included) use the
// other interfaces on purpose:
//
// - dns: DNS (port 53) may only go through the TUN. Windows sends a name
// query to the DNS servers of all interfaces, not only to those of the TUN:
// to the first server of each interface, then to all of them when no answer
// arrives within a second or two. The physical interface usually got an
// on-link resolver like 192.168.1.1 from DHCP, and its LAN route is more
// specific than the TUN's default route, so those queries would leave
// through the physical link.
// - ipv6: no IPv6 at all, in either direction, for a TUN that cannot carry
// it, except loopback and what Windows itself needs on the local link
// (neighbor and multicast listener discovery, DHCPv6), none of which can
// leave it.
//
// The filters live in a dynamic WFP session: closing the returned engine handle
// with closeWFPEngine deletes them, and so does Windows when the process dies.
func blockLeaks(tun winipcfg.LUID, dns, ipv6 bool) (windows.Handle, error) {
engine, err := openWFPEngine()
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmTransactionBegin0.Call(uintptr(engine), 0)); err != nil {
closeWFPEngine(engine)
return 0, errors.New("FwpmTransactionBegin0 failed").Base(err)
}
err = addLeakFilters(engine, tun, dns, ipv6)
if err == nil {
if err = fwpmResult(procFwpmTransactionCommit0.Call(uintptr(engine))); err != nil {
err = errors.New("FwpmTransactionCommit0 failed").Base(err)
}
}
if err != nil {
procFwpmTransactionAbort0.Call(uintptr(engine))
closeWFPEngine(engine)
return 0, err
}
return engine, nil
}
func openWFPEngine() (windows.Handle, error) {
if err := modfwpuclnt.Load(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
// txnWaitTimeoutInMSec stays 0 for BFE's default, so that a transaction
// held by another program cannot hang the start forever.
session := fwpmSession0{
displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: utf16Ptr("Xray TUN")},
flags: fwpmSessionFlagDynamic,
}
var engine windows.Handle
if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmEngineOpen0.Call(0, rpcCAuthnWinNT, 0, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&session)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&engine)))); err != nil {
return 0, errors.New("FwpmEngineOpen0 failed").Base(err)
}
return engine, nil
}
func closeWFPEngine(engine windows.Handle) {
procFwpmEngineClose0.Call(uintptr(engine))
}
// addLeakFilters adds the filters of blockLeaks in a sublayer of their own.
// blockLeaks runs it in a transaction, so that they take effect all at once.
func addLeakFilters(engine windows.Handle, tun winipcfg.LUID, dns, ipv6 bool) error {
exe, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
return err
}
exePath, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(exe)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var appID *fwpByteBlob
if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0.Call(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(exePath)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&appID)))); err != nil {
return errors.New("FwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0 failed for ", exe).Base(err)
}
defer func() { procFwpmFreeMemory0.Call(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&appID))) }()
sublayer := fwpmSublayer0{
displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: utf16Ptr("Xray TUN")},
weight: 0xffff,
}
if sublayer.subLayerKey, err = windows.GenerateGUID(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmSubLayerAdd0.Call(uintptr(engine), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&sublayer)), 0)); err != nil {
return errors.New("FwpmSubLayerAdd0 failed").Base(err)
}
add := func(layer *windows.GUID, name string, flags, action uint32, weight uint8, conditions ...fwpmFilterCondition0) error {
return addFilter(engine, &sublayer.subLayerKey, layer, "Xray TUN: "+name, flags, action, weight, conditions...)
}
var pinner runtime.Pinner
defer pinner.Unpin()
tunLUID := new(uint64)
*tunLUID = uint64(tun)
pinner.Pin(tunLUID) // the condition only holds it as uintptr
// The heaviest matching filter of a sublayer decides. All sublayers have
// their say, though, and a block in any of them beats a permit, unless
// the permit is hard: it clears the action right, and then the blocks of
// lower sublayers, Windows Firewall rules among them, no longer override
// it, only a callout's veto does. Xray's own connections out get such a
// hard permit. Connections from outside to Xray get an ordinary one, so
// that firewalls keep guarding its inbounds.
self := condition(&fwpmConditionALEAppID, fwpByteBlobType, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(appID)))
dns53 := condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 53)
// DNS goes through the TUN when its local address is the TUN's, and it
// also leaves, or arrives, through the TUN. The local address alone
// decides by default, but with weak host sending or receiving enabled,
// packets of the TUN's address can use other interfaces. (The next hop,
// the interface replies would leave by, is not known for arriving ones.)
onTUN := func(field *windows.GUID) fwpmFilterCondition0 {
return condition(field, fwpUint64, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(tunLUID)))
}
out := []fwpmFilterCondition0{dns53, onTUN(&fwpmConditionIPLocalInterface), onTUN(&fwpmConditionIPNexthopInterface)}
in := []fwpmFilterCondition0{dns53, onTUN(&fwpmConditionIPLocalInterface), onTUN(&fwpmConditionIPArrivalInterface)}
for _, layer := range []struct {
key *windows.GUID
selfFlags uint32
throughTUN []fwpmFilterCondition0
}{
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV4, fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight, out},
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV4, 0, in},
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV6, fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight, out},
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV6, 0, in},
} {
if err := add(layer.key, "permit Xray", layer.selfFlags, fwpActionPermit, 4, self); err != nil {
return err
}
if dns {
if err := add(layer.key, "permit DNS through the TUN", 0, fwpActionPermit, 3, layer.throughTUN...); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := add(layer.key, "block DNS", 0, fwpActionBlock, 2, dns53); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
if ipv6 {
// Both directions: replies to a connection accepted from outside
// would leave through the physical link as well.
loopback := fwpmFilterCondition0{
fieldKey: fwpmConditionFlags,
matchType: fwpMatchFlagsAllSet,
conditionValue: fwpValue0{typ: fwpUint32, value: fwpConditionFlagIsLoopback},
}
// Neighbor and multicast listener discovery, ICMPv6 130-137 and 143,
// whose type and code sit where the local and remote port are.
discovery := []fwpmFilterCondition0{condition(&fwpmConditionIPProtocol, fwpUint8, windows.IPPROTO_ICMPV6)}
for _, typ := range []uintptr{130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 143} {
discovery = append(discovery, condition(&fwpmConditionIPLocalPort, fwpUint16, typ))
}
discovery = append(discovery, condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 0))
dhcpv6 := []fwpmFilterCondition0{
condition(&fwpmConditionIPProtocol, fwpUint8, windows.IPPROTO_UDP),
condition(&fwpmConditionIPLocalPort, fwpUint16, 546),
condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 547),
}
for _, direction := range []struct {
layer *windows.GUID
dhcpv6 []fwpmFilterCondition0
}{
// The client sends to the servers' multicast address, and they
// answer from their own.
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV6, slices.Concat(dhcpv6, []fwpmFilterCondition0{condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemoteAddress, fwpByteArray16Type, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&ipv6AllDHCPv6Servers)))})},
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV6, dhcpv6},
} {
if err := add(direction.layer, "permit IPv6 loopback", 0, fwpActionPermit, 1, loopback); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := add(direction.layer, "permit IPv6 neighbor and multicast listener discovery", 0, fwpActionPermit, 1, discovery...); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := add(direction.layer, "permit DHCPv6", 0, fwpActionPermit, 1, direction.dhcpv6...); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := add(direction.layer, "block IPv6", 0, fwpActionBlock, 0); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
func addFilter(engine windows.Handle, sublayer, layer *windows.GUID, name string, flags, action uint32, weight uint8, conditions ...fwpmFilterCondition0) error {
filter := fwpmFilter0{
displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: utf16Ptr(name)},
flags: flags,
layerKey: *layer,
subLayerKey: *sublayer,
weight: fwpValue0{typ: fwpUint8, value: uintptr(weight)},
numFilterConditions: uint32(len(conditions)),
action: fwpmAction0{typ: action},
}
if len(conditions) > 0 {
filter.filterCondition = &conditions[0]
}
if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmFilterAdd0.Call(uintptr(engine), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&filter)), 0, 0)); err != nil {
return errors.New("FwpmFilterAdd0 failed for ", name).Base(err)
}
return nil
}
// dnsOutsideTUN returns the servers outside all of prefixes, the TUN's own
// subnets and routes: queries to them cannot go through the TUN.
func dnsOutsideTUN(servers []netip.Addr, prefixes []netip.Prefix) []netip.Addr {
var outside []netip.Addr
for _, server := range servers {
server = server.Unmap()
if !slices.ContainsFunc(prefixes, func(p netip.Prefix) bool { return p.Contains(server) }) {
outside = append(outside, server)
}
}
return outside
}
// flushDNSCache drops the answers Windows cached so far, like ipconfig
// /flushdns, so that names get resolved again with the current DNS setup.
func flushDNSCache() error {
if err := procDnsFlushResolverCache.Find(); err != nil {
return err
}
if r, _, err := procDnsFlushResolverCache.Call(); r == 0 {
return err
}
return nil
}