Files
Xray-core/proxy/tun/tun_windows_wfp.go
T
patternihaandClaude Opus 5.5 2218fec173 TUN inbound's autoSystemWfpBlockLeak: Add "tcpv4", "tcpv6", "udpv4", "udpv6", "icmpv4" and "icmpv6"
"v4" or "v6" after the protocol limits a value to one IP version, ports
written the same way, e.g. "tcpv4/853" or "udpv6/10-20"; "icmpv4" is ICMP
and "icmpv6" is ICMPv6. Their filters go to the ALE layers of that version
only. "tcp", "udp" and "icmp" keep covering both.

Anything covering TCP or UDP port 53 in either IP version, like
"udpv4/53", still needs dns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-02 13:09:55 +03:30

650 lines
26 KiB
Go

//go:build windows
package tun
import (
"encoding/binary"
"net/netip"
"os"
"runtime"
"slices"
"strings"
"unsafe"
"github.com/xtls/xray-core/common/errors"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows/tunnel/winipcfg"
)
var (
modfwpuclnt = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("fwpuclnt.dll")
moddnsapi = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("dnsapi.dll")
procFwpmEngineOpen0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmEngineOpen0")
procFwpmEngineClose0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmEngineClose0")
procFwpmTransactionBegin0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmTransactionBegin0")
procFwpmTransactionCommit0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmTransactionCommit0")
procFwpmTransactionAbort0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmTransactionAbort0")
procFwpmSubLayerAdd0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmSubLayerAdd0")
procFwpmFilterAdd0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmFilterAdd0")
procFwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0")
procFwpmFreeMemory0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmFreeMemory0")
procDnsFlushResolverCache = moddnsapi.NewProc("DnsFlushResolverCache")
)
// fwptypes.h and fwpmtypes.h
const (
rpcCAuthnWinNT = 10 // RPC_C_AUTHN_WINNT
fwpmSessionFlagDynamic = 1 // FWPM_SESSION_FLAG_DYNAMIC
fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight = 8 // FWPM_FILTER_FLAG_CLEAR_ACTION_RIGHT
fwpUint8 = 1 // FWP_UINT8
fwpUint16 = 2 // FWP_UINT16
fwpUint32 = 3 // FWP_UINT32
fwpUint64 = 4 // FWP_UINT64
fwpByteArray16Type = 11 // FWP_BYTE_ARRAY16_TYPE
fwpByteBlobType = 12 // FWP_BYTE_BLOB_TYPE
fwpSecurityDescriptorType = 14 // FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE
fwpV4AddrMask = 0x100 // FWP_V4_ADDR_MASK
fwpV6AddrMask = 0x101 // FWP_V6_ADDR_MASK
fwpRangeType = 0x102 // FWP_RANGE_TYPE
fwpMatchEqual = 0 // FWP_MATCH_EQUAL
fwpMatchRange = 5 // FWP_MATCH_RANGE
fwpMatchFlagsAllSet = 6 // FWP_MATCH_FLAGS_ALL_SET
fwpConditionFlagIsLoopback = 1 // FWP_CONDITION_FLAG_IS_LOOPBACK
fwpActionBlock = 0x1001 // FWP_ACTION_BLOCK
fwpActionPermit = 0x1002 // FWP_ACTION_PERMIT
)
// fwpmu.h
var (
fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV4 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xc38d57d1, Data2: 0x05a7, Data3: 0x4c33, Data4: [8]byte{0x90, 0x4f, 0x7f, 0xbc, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x0e, 0x82}}
fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV6 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x4a72393b, Data2: 0x319f, Data3: 0x44bc, Data4: [8]byte{0x84, 0xc3, 0xba, 0x54, 0xdc, 0xb3, 0xb6, 0xb4}}
fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV4 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xe1cd9fe7, Data2: 0xf4b5, Data3: 0x4273, Data4: [8]byte{0x96, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x2e, 0x48, 0x7b, 0x86, 0x50}}
fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV6 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xa3b42c97, Data2: 0x9f04, Data3: 0x4672, Data4: [8]byte{0xb8, 0x7e, 0xce, 0xe9, 0xc4, 0x83, 0x25, 0x7f}}
fwpmConditionFlags = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x632ce23b, Data2: 0x5167, Data3: 0x435c, Data4: [8]byte{0x86, 0xd7, 0xe9, 0x03, 0x68, 0x4a, 0xa8, 0x0c}}
fwpmConditionIPArrivalInterface = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x618a9b6d, Data2: 0x386b, Data3: 0x4136, Data4: [8]byte{0xad, 0x6e, 0xb5, 0x15, 0x87, 0xcf, 0xb1, 0xcd}}
fwpmConditionIPLocalInterface = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x4cd62a49, Data2: 0x59c3, Data3: 0x4969, Data4: [8]byte{0xb7, 0xf3, 0xbd, 0xa5, 0xd3, 0x28, 0x90, 0xa4}}
fwpmConditionIPLocalPort = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x0c1ba1af, Data2: 0x5765, Data3: 0x453f, Data4: [8]byte{0xaf, 0x22, 0xa8, 0xf7, 0x91, 0xac, 0x77, 0x5b}} // also FWPM_CONDITION_ICMP_TYPE
fwpmConditionIPNexthopInterface = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x93ae8f5b, Data2: 0x7f6f, Data3: 0x4719, Data4: [8]byte{0x98, 0xc8, 0x14, 0xe9, 0x74, 0x29, 0xef, 0x04}}
fwpmConditionIPProtocol = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x3971ef2b, Data2: 0x623e, Data3: 0x4f9a, Data4: [8]byte{0x8c, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0x79, 0xb8, 0x06, 0xb9, 0xa7}}
fwpmConditionIPRemoteAddress = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xb235ae9a, Data2: 0x1d64, Data3: 0x49b8, Data4: [8]byte{0xa4, 0x4c, 0x5f, 0xf3, 0xd9, 0x09, 0x50, 0x45}}
fwpmConditionIPRemotePort = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xc35a604d, Data2: 0xd22b, Data3: 0x4e1a, Data4: [8]byte{0x91, 0xb4, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x74, 0xee, 0x67, 0x4b}} // also FWPM_CONDITION_ICMP_CODE
fwpmConditionALEAppID = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xd78e1e87, Data2: 0x8644, Data3: 0x4ea5, Data4: [8]byte{0x94, 0x37, 0xd8, 0x09, 0xec, 0xef, 0xc9, 0x71}}
fwpmConditionALEUserID = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xaf043a0a, Data2: 0xb34d, Data3: 0x4f86, Data4: [8]byte{0x97, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0x03, 0x71, 0xaf, 0x6e, 0x66}}
)
// dnsClientSID is the SID of Windows' DNS Client service, NT SERVICE\Dnscache.
// Service SIDs derive from the service name, so it is the same everywhere (sc
// showsid dnscache).
const dnsClientSID = "S-1-5-80-859482183-879914841-863379149-1145462774-2388618682"
// ff02::1:2, where DHCPv6 clients send to. A package-level variable never
// moves, so conditions may refer to it through uintptr.
var ipv6AllDHCPv6Servers = [16]byte{0xff, 0x02, 13: 0x01, 15: 0x02}
type fwpByteBlob struct {
size uint32
data *byte
}
// fwpValue0 is FWP_VALUE0 as well as FWP_CONDITION_VALUE0. Their union holds
// a scalar of at most 32 bits, or a pointer for the larger types.
type fwpValue0 struct {
typ uint32
value uintptr
}
// fwpRange0 is FWP_RANGE0, which an FWP_RANGE_TYPE condition points to.
type fwpRange0 struct {
low, high fwpValue0
}
// fwpV4AddrAndMask is FWP_V4_ADDR_AND_MASK, in host byte order.
type fwpV4AddrAndMask struct {
addr, mask uint32
}
// fwpV6AddrAndMask is FWP_V6_ADDR_AND_MASK.
type fwpV6AddrAndMask struct {
addr [16]byte
prefixLength uint8
}
// lanPrefixes are what "allexceptlan" leaves to the local network: private
// and link-local addresses, and multicast and broadcast, which discovery on
// it uses.
var lanPrefixes = []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/12"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("169.254.0.0/16"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("224.0.0.0/4"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("255.255.255.255/32"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("fc00::/7"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("fe80::/10"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("ff00::/8"),
}
type fwpmDisplayData0 struct {
name *uint16
description *uint16
}
type fwpmSession0 struct {
sessionKey windows.GUID
displayData fwpmDisplayData0
flags uint32
txnWaitTimeoutInMSec uint32
processID uint32
sid *windows.SID
username *uint16
kernelMode int32
}
type fwpmSublayer0 struct {
subLayerKey windows.GUID
displayData fwpmDisplayData0
flags uint32
providerKey *windows.GUID
providerData fwpByteBlob
weight uint16
}
type fwpmFilterCondition0 struct {
fieldKey windows.GUID
matchType uint32
conditionValue fwpValue0
}
type fwpmAction0 struct {
typ uint32
filterType windows.GUID
}
type fwpmFilter0 struct {
filterKey windows.GUID
displayData fwpmDisplayData0
flags uint32
providerKey *windows.GUID
providerData fwpByteBlob
layerKey windows.GUID
subLayerKey windows.GUID
weight fwpValue0
numFilterConditions uint32
filterCondition *fwpmFilterCondition0
action fwpmAction0
_ uint32 // C aligns the following union to 8 bytes, as it holds a UINT64
providerContextKey windows.GUID
reserved *windows.GUID
_ [8 - unsafe.Sizeof(uintptr(0))]byte // and filterId as well, also on 32-bit
filterID uint64
effectiveWeight fwpValue0
}
// fwpmResult converts the DWORD status the Fwpm functions return.
func fwpmResult(r1, _ uintptr, _ error) error {
if r1 != 0 {
return windows.Errno(r1)
}
return nil
}
func utf16Ptr(s string) *uint16 {
p, _ := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(s)
return p
}
func condition(field *windows.GUID, typ uint32, value uintptr) fwpmFilterCondition0 {
return fwpmFilterCondition0{
fieldKey: *field,
matchType: fwpMatchEqual,
conditionValue: fwpValue0{typ: typ, value: value},
}
}
// leakFilters is what blockLeaks keeps from leaving outside the TUN.
type leakFilters struct {
traffic []leakTraffic // connections of these protocols and ports
dnsClient bool // Windows' DNS Client service
ipv4, ipv6 bool // an IP version altogether
lan bool // except to and from the local network
}
// newLeakFilters turns expanded autoSystemWfpBlockLeak values into the filters
// for a TUN that the routes of route4 (IPv4) and route6 (IPv6) lead to.
func newLeakFilters(leaks []string, route4, route6 bool) leakFilters {
var block leakFilters
var all, allExceptLAN bool
for _, leak := range leaks {
switch leak {
case "windnsclient":
block.dnsClient = dnsClientUsesAnyPort()
case "misconfigtun":
block.ipv4, block.ipv6 = block.ipv4 || !route4, block.ipv6 || !route6
case "all":
all = true
case "allexceptlan":
allExceptLAN = true
default:
if traffic, ok := parseLeakTraffic(leak); ok {
block.traffic = append(block.traffic, traffic)
}
}
}
if all || allExceptLAN {
block.ipv4, block.ipv6 = true, true
block.lan = !all
}
return block
}
// String lists what block keeps inside the TUN, or is empty for nothing.
func (block leakFilters) String() string {
var blocked []string
for _, traffic := range block.traffic {
blocked = append(blocked, traffic.String())
}
exceptLAN := ""
if block.lan {
exceptLAN = " except LAN"
}
for _, b := range []struct {
on bool
what string
}{{block.dnsClient, "windnsclient"}, {block.ipv4, "IPv4" + exceptLAN}, {block.ipv6, "IPv6" + exceptLAN}} {
if b.on {
blocked = append(blocked, b.what)
}
}
return strings.Join(blocked, ", ")
}
// systemDNS tells whether block keeps the system's DNS inside the TUN: port
// 53, the DNS Client service, or both IP versions altogether, though not on
// the local network, where a resolver like the router's may be.
func (block leakFilters) systemDNS() bool {
return block.dnsClient || block.ipv4 && block.ipv6 && !block.lan || slices.ContainsFunc(block.traffic, func(traffic leakTraffic) bool {
return traffic.covers("udp", 53) || traffic.covers("tcp", 53)
})
}
// dnsClientUsesAnyPort tells whether Windows' DNS Client service may send its
// queries over HTTPS or TLS, and so to any port, which it does since Windows 11
// and Server 2022 (build 20348). Earlier versions only query port 53, and may
// run the service in one process with others, which its filters would catch
// as well.
func dnsClientUsesAnyPort() bool {
_, _, build := windows.RtlGetNtVersionNumbers()
return build >= 20348
}
// blockLeaks keeps traffic from leaving through interfaces other than tun,
// for every program but Xray itself, whose outbounds (DNS included) use the
// other interfaces on purpose:
//
// - traffic: connections of these protocols, TCP and UDP to some or all
// ports, or ICMP, over one IP version or both, may only go through the
// TUN, those of DNS (53), DNS over TLS (TCP 853) and DNS over QUIC (UDP
// 853) with "dns". Windows sends a name query to the DNS servers of all
// interfaces, not only to those of the TUN: to the first server of each
// interface, then to all of them when no answer arrives within a second
// or two. It sends the queries for the servers of an interface out
// through that interface, whatever the routes say, and other programs
// reach an on-link resolver, like 192.168.1.1 from DHCP, through its LAN
// route, which is more specific than the TUN's default route.
// - dnsClient: since Windows 11 and Server 2022, Windows may also send its
// queries over HTTPS or TLS, to any port, so its DNS Client service may not
// connect outside the TUN at all, except for name resolution on the local
// link (mDNS, LLMNR).
// - ipv4, ipv6: no IPv4, or no IPv6, at all outside the TUN, in either
// direction: for a TUN that no route of that version leads to, or for
// everything with "all", or with "allexceptlan" (lan) except to and from
// the local network, below the other filters, which so still apply there.
// The TUN carries what is routed to it even without an address of that
// IP version in gateway: Windows gives it link-local ones itself, an IPv6
// one at once, an IPv4 one from 169.254.0.0/16 after some seconds (until
// then, IPv4 routed to the TUN is unreachable).
//
// Whatever is blocked, loopback, which cannot leave the system, and what
// Windows itself needs on the local link stay allowed: DHCP, and for IPv6
// neighbor and multicast listener discovery.
//
// The filters live in a dynamic WFP session: closing the returned engine handle
// with closeWFPEngine deletes them, and so does Windows when the process dies.
func blockLeaks(tun winipcfg.LUID, block leakFilters) (windows.Handle, error) {
engine, err := openWFPEngine()
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmTransactionBegin0.Call(uintptr(engine), 0)); err != nil {
closeWFPEngine(engine)
return 0, errors.New("FwpmTransactionBegin0 failed").Base(err)
}
err = addLeakFilters(engine, tun, block)
if err == nil {
if err = fwpmResult(procFwpmTransactionCommit0.Call(uintptr(engine))); err != nil {
err = errors.New("FwpmTransactionCommit0 failed").Base(err)
}
}
if err != nil {
procFwpmTransactionAbort0.Call(uintptr(engine))
closeWFPEngine(engine)
return 0, err
}
return engine, nil
}
func openWFPEngine() (windows.Handle, error) {
if err := modfwpuclnt.Load(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
// txnWaitTimeoutInMSec stays 0 for BFE's default, so that a transaction
// held by another program cannot hang the start forever.
session := fwpmSession0{
displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: utf16Ptr("Xray TUN")},
flags: fwpmSessionFlagDynamic,
}
var engine windows.Handle
if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmEngineOpen0.Call(0, rpcCAuthnWinNT, 0, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&session)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&engine)))); err != nil {
return 0, errors.New("FwpmEngineOpen0 failed").Base(err)
}
return engine, nil
}
func closeWFPEngine(engine windows.Handle) {
procFwpmEngineClose0.Call(uintptr(engine))
}
// addLeakFilters adds the filters of blockLeaks in a sublayer of their own.
// blockLeaks runs it in a transaction, so that they take effect all at once.
func addLeakFilters(engine windows.Handle, tun winipcfg.LUID, block leakFilters) error {
exe, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
return err
}
exePath, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(exe)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var appID *fwpByteBlob
if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0.Call(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(exePath)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&appID)))); err != nil {
return errors.New("FwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0 failed for ", exe).Base(err)
}
defer func() { procFwpmFreeMemory0.Call(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&appID))) }()
sublayer := fwpmSublayer0{
displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: utf16Ptr("Xray TUN")},
weight: 0xffff,
}
if sublayer.subLayerKey, err = windows.GenerateGUID(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmSubLayerAdd0.Call(uintptr(engine), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&sublayer)), 0)); err != nil {
return errors.New("FwpmSubLayerAdd0 failed").Base(err)
}
add := func(layer *windows.GUID, name string, flags, action uint32, weight uint8, conditions ...fwpmFilterCondition0) error {
return addFilter(engine, &sublayer.subLayerKey, layer, "Xray TUN: "+name, flags, action, weight, conditions...)
}
var pinner runtime.Pinner
defer pinner.Unpin()
tunLUID := new(uint64)
*tunLUID = uint64(tun)
pinner.Pin(tunLUID) // the condition only holds it as uintptr
// The heaviest matching filter of a sublayer decides. All sublayers have
// their say, though, and a block in any of them beats a permit, unless
// the permit is hard: it clears the action right, and then the blocks of
// lower sublayers, Windows Firewall rules among them, no longer override
// it, only a callout's veto does. Xray's own connections out get such a
// hard permit. Connections from outside to Xray get an ordinary one, so
// that firewalls keep guarding its inbounds.
self := condition(&fwpmConditionALEAppID, fwpByteBlobType, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(appID)))
// A connection goes through the TUN when its local address is the TUN's,
// and it also leaves, or arrives, through the TUN. The local address alone
// decides by default, but with weak host sending or receiving enabled,
// packets of the TUN's address can use other interfaces. (The next hop,
// the interface replies would leave by, is not known for arriving ones.)
onTUN := func(field *windows.GUID) fwpmFilterCondition0 {
return condition(field, fwpUint64, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(tunLUID)))
}
// toLAN matches the remote addresses of lanPrefixes of an IP version:
// conditions on the same field match when any of them does.
toLAN := func(ipv6 bool) []fwpmFilterCondition0 {
var conditions []fwpmFilterCondition0
for _, prefix := range lanPrefixes {
if prefix.Addr().Is6() != ipv6 {
continue
}
var value uintptr
typ := uint32(fwpV4AddrMask)
if ipv6 {
addr := &fwpV6AddrAndMask{addr: prefix.Addr().As16(), prefixLength: uint8(prefix.Bits())}
pinner.Pin(addr) // the condition only holds it as uintptr
value, typ = uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(addr)), fwpV6AddrMask
} else {
a := prefix.Addr().As4()
addr := &fwpV4AddrAndMask{addr: binary.BigEndian.Uint32(a[:]), mask: ^uint32(0) << (32 - prefix.Bits())}
pinner.Pin(addr) // the condition only holds it as uintptr
value = uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(addr))
}
conditions = append(conditions, condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemoteAddress, typ, value))
}
return conditions
}
// toPorts matches the ports of traffic, if not all of them.
toPorts := func(traffic leakTraffic) []fwpmFilterCondition0 {
switch {
case traffic.low == 0:
return nil
case traffic.low == traffic.high:
return []fwpmFilterCondition0{condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, uintptr(traffic.low))}
}
ports := &fwpRange0{
low: fwpValue0{typ: fwpUint16, value: uintptr(traffic.low)},
high: fwpValue0{typ: fwpUint16, value: uintptr(traffic.high)},
}
pinner.Pin(ports) // the condition only holds it as uintptr
return []fwpmFilterCondition0{{
fieldKey: fwpmConditionIPRemotePort,
matchType: fwpMatchRange,
conditionValue: fwpValue0{typ: fwpRangeType, value: uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(ports))},
}}
}
// What stays allowed whatever is blocked, in both directions: replies to
// a connection accepted from outside would leave through the physical
// link as well.
type permit struct {
name string
conditions []fwpmFilterCondition0
}
loopback := permit{"loopback", []fwpmFilterCondition0{{
fieldKey: fwpmConditionFlags,
matchType: fwpMatchFlagsAllSet,
conditionValue: fwpValue0{typ: fwpUint32, value: fwpConditionFlagIsLoopback},
}}}
// DHCP keeps the addresses of the other interfaces, which Xray's own
// connections use.
dhcp := permit{"DHCP", []fwpmFilterCondition0{
condition(&fwpmConditionIPProtocol, fwpUint8, windows.IPPROTO_UDP),
condition(&fwpmConditionIPLocalPort, fwpUint16, 68),
condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 67),
}}
// Neighbor and multicast listener discovery, ICMPv6 130-137 and 143,
// whose type and code sit where the local and remote port are.
discovery := permit{"IPv6 neighbor and multicast listener discovery", []fwpmFilterCondition0{condition(&fwpmConditionIPProtocol, fwpUint8, windows.IPPROTO_ICMPV6)}}
for _, typ := range []uintptr{130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 143} {
discovery.conditions = append(discovery.conditions, condition(&fwpmConditionIPLocalPort, fwpUint16, typ))
}
discovery.conditions = append(discovery.conditions, condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 0))
dhcpv6 := []fwpmFilterCondition0{
condition(&fwpmConditionIPProtocol, fwpUint8, windows.IPPROTO_UDP),
condition(&fwpmConditionIPLocalPort, fwpUint16, 546),
condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 547),
}
// The DHCPv6 client sends to the servers' multicast address, and they
// answer from their own.
dhcpv6Out := permit{"DHCPv6", slices.Concat(dhcpv6, []fwpmFilterCondition0{condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemoteAddress, fwpByteArray16Type, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&ipv6AllDHCPv6Servers)))})}
dhcpv6In := permit{"DHCPv6", dhcpv6}
for _, layer := range []struct {
key *windows.GUID
selfFlags uint32
via *windows.GUID // the interface that has to be the TUN as well
ipv6 bool
permits []permit
}{
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV4, fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight, &fwpmConditionIPNexthopInterface, false, []permit{loopback, dhcp}},
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV4, 0, &fwpmConditionIPArrivalInterface, false, []permit{loopback, dhcp}},
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV6, fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight, &fwpmConditionIPNexthopInterface, true, []permit{loopback, discovery, dhcpv6Out}},
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV6, 0, &fwpmConditionIPArrivalInterface, true, []permit{loopback, discovery, dhcpv6In}},
} {
throughTUN := []fwpmFilterCondition0{onTUN(&fwpmConditionIPLocalInterface), onTUN(layer.via)}
if err := add(layer.key, "permit Xray", layer.selfFlags, fwpActionPermit, 4, self); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, p := range layer.permits {
if err := add(layer.key, "permit "+p.name, 0, fwpActionPermit, 3, p.conditions...); err != nil {
return err
}
}
for _, traffic := range block.traffic {
if traffic.version == "v4" && layer.ipv6 || traffic.version == "v6" && !layer.ipv6 {
continue // for the other IP version only
}
protocol := uintptr(windows.IPPROTO_UDP)
switch {
case traffic.protocol == "tcp":
protocol = windows.IPPROTO_TCP
case traffic.protocol == "icmp" && layer.ipv6:
protocol = windows.IPPROTO_ICMPV6
case traffic.protocol == "icmp":
protocol = windows.IPPROTO_ICMP
}
matches := slices.Concat([]fwpmFilterCondition0{condition(&fwpmConditionIPProtocol, fwpUint8, protocol)}, toPorts(traffic))
if err := add(layer.key, "permit "+traffic.String()+" through the TUN", 0, fwpActionPermit, 3, slices.Concat(matches, throughTUN)...); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := add(layer.key, "block "+traffic.String(), 0, fwpActionBlock, 2, matches...); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if family := "IPv4"; layer.ipv6 && block.ipv6 || !layer.ipv6 && block.ipv4 {
if layer.ipv6 {
family = "IPv6"
}
if err := add(layer.key, "permit "+family+" through the TUN", 0, fwpActionPermit, 1, throughTUN...); err != nil {
return err
}
// Below the other values, which so still apply on the local
// network, DNS with "allexceptlan" among them.
if block.lan {
if err := add(layer.key, "permit "+family+" LAN", 0, fwpActionPermit, 1, toLAN(layer.ipv6)...); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if err := add(layer.key, "block "+family, 0, fwpActionBlock, 0); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
// Since Windows 11 and Server 2022, the DNS Client service may also send
// the queries for an interface's servers over HTTPS or TLS, out through
// that interface and to any port. So there it may only connect through
// the TUN, except for mDNS and LLMNR, which stay on the local link (over
// an IP version only while it is not blocked altogether, or with
// "allexceptlan" to the local network's addresses). Like Windows
// Firewall's rules for it, the filters recognize the service by its SID,
// which Windows puts in the token of its process: the security descriptor
// grants that SID the right to match (FWP_ACTRL_MATCH_FILTER, CC in SDDL).
if block.dnsClient {
sd, err := windows.SecurityDescriptorFromString("O:SYG:SYD:(A;;CCRC;;;" + dnsClientSID + ")")
if err != nil {
return err
}
sdBlob := &fwpByteBlob{size: sd.Length(), data: (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(sd))}
pinner.Pin(sdBlob) // the condition only holds it as uintptr
dnsClient := condition(&fwpmConditionALEUserID, fwpSecurityDescriptorType, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(sdBlob)))
// Conditions on the same field match when any of them does.
mdnsLLMNR := []fwpmFilterCondition0{dnsClient, condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 5353), condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 5355)}
for _, layer := range []struct {
key *windows.GUID
ipv6 bool
localLink bool
}{
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV4, false, !block.ipv4 || block.lan},
{&fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV6, true, !block.ipv6 || block.lan},
} {
if err := add(layer.key, "permit the DNS Client service through the TUN", 0, fwpActionPermit, 3, dnsClient, onTUN(&fwpmConditionIPLocalInterface), onTUN(&fwpmConditionIPNexthopInterface)); err != nil {
return err
}
if layer.localLink {
localLink := mdnsLLMNR
if block.lan {
localLink = slices.Concat(mdnsLLMNR, toLAN(layer.ipv6))
}
if err := add(layer.key, "permit the DNS Client service's mDNS and LLMNR", 0, fwpActionPermit, 3, localLink...); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if err := add(layer.key, "block the DNS Client service", 0, fwpActionBlock, 2, dnsClient); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
func addFilter(engine windows.Handle, sublayer, layer *windows.GUID, name string, flags, action uint32, weight uint8, conditions ...fwpmFilterCondition0) error {
filter := fwpmFilter0{
displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: utf16Ptr(name)},
flags: flags,
layerKey: *layer,
subLayerKey: *sublayer,
weight: fwpValue0{typ: fwpUint8, value: uintptr(weight)},
numFilterConditions: uint32(len(conditions)),
action: fwpmAction0{typ: action},
}
if len(conditions) > 0 {
filter.filterCondition = &conditions[0]
}
if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmFilterAdd0.Call(uintptr(engine), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&filter)), 0, 0)); err != nil {
return errors.New("FwpmFilterAdd0 failed for ", name).Base(err)
}
return nil
}
// dnsOutsideTUN returns the servers whose queries the filters block: those
// outside all of prefixes, the TUN's own subnets and routes, as queries to
// them cannot go through the TUN. Loopback ones, local resolvers, are not
// among them, as loopback stays allowed.
func dnsOutsideTUN(servers []netip.Addr, prefixes []netip.Prefix) []netip.Addr {
var outside []netip.Addr
for _, server := range servers {
server = server.Unmap()
if !server.IsLoopback() && !slices.ContainsFunc(prefixes, func(p netip.Prefix) bool { return p.Contains(server) }) {
outside = append(outside, server)
}
}
return outside
}
// flushDNSCache drops the answers Windows cached so far, like ipconfig
// /flushdns, so that names get resolved again with the current DNS setup.
func flushDNSCache() error {
if err := procDnsFlushResolverCache.Find(); err != nil {
return err
}
if r, _, err := procDnsFlushResolverCache.Call(); r == 0 {
return err
}
return nil
}