//go:build windows package tun import ( "net/netip" "os" "runtime" "slices" "strings" "unsafe" "github.com/xtls/xray-core/common/errors" "golang.org/x/sys/windows" "golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows/tunnel/winipcfg" ) var ( modfwpuclnt = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("fwpuclnt.dll") moddnsapi = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("dnsapi.dll") procFwpmEngineOpen0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmEngineOpen0") procFwpmEngineClose0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmEngineClose0") procFwpmTransactionBegin0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmTransactionBegin0") procFwpmTransactionCommit0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmTransactionCommit0") procFwpmTransactionAbort0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmTransactionAbort0") procFwpmSubLayerAdd0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmSubLayerAdd0") procFwpmFilterAdd0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmFilterAdd0") procFwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0") procFwpmFreeMemory0 = modfwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmFreeMemory0") procDnsFlushResolverCache = moddnsapi.NewProc("DnsFlushResolverCache") ) // fwptypes.h and fwpmtypes.h const ( rpcCAuthnWinNT = 10 // RPC_C_AUTHN_WINNT fwpmSessionFlagDynamic = 1 // FWPM_SESSION_FLAG_DYNAMIC fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight = 8 // FWPM_FILTER_FLAG_CLEAR_ACTION_RIGHT fwpUint8 = 1 // FWP_UINT8 fwpUint16 = 2 // FWP_UINT16 fwpUint32 = 3 // FWP_UINT32 fwpUint64 = 4 // FWP_UINT64 fwpByteArray16Type = 11 // FWP_BYTE_ARRAY16_TYPE fwpByteBlobType = 12 // FWP_BYTE_BLOB_TYPE fwpSecurityDescriptorType = 14 // FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE fwpRangeType = 0x102 // FWP_RANGE_TYPE fwpMatchEqual = 0 // FWP_MATCH_EQUAL fwpMatchRange = 5 // FWP_MATCH_RANGE fwpMatchFlagsAllSet = 6 // FWP_MATCH_FLAGS_ALL_SET fwpConditionFlagIsLoopback = 1 // FWP_CONDITION_FLAG_IS_LOOPBACK fwpActionBlock = 0x1001 // FWP_ACTION_BLOCK fwpActionPermit = 0x1002 // FWP_ACTION_PERMIT ) // fwpmu.h var ( fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV4 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xc38d57d1, Data2: 0x05a7, Data3: 0x4c33, Data4: [8]byte{0x90, 0x4f, 0x7f, 0xbc, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x0e, 0x82}} fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV6 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x4a72393b, Data2: 0x319f, Data3: 0x44bc, Data4: [8]byte{0x84, 0xc3, 0xba, 0x54, 0xdc, 0xb3, 0xb6, 0xb4}} fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV4 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xe1cd9fe7, Data2: 0xf4b5, Data3: 0x4273, Data4: [8]byte{0x96, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x2e, 0x48, 0x7b, 0x86, 0x50}} fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV6 = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xa3b42c97, Data2: 0x9f04, Data3: 0x4672, Data4: [8]byte{0xb8, 0x7e, 0xce, 0xe9, 0xc4, 0x83, 0x25, 0x7f}} fwpmConditionFlags = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x632ce23b, Data2: 0x5167, Data3: 0x435c, Data4: [8]byte{0x86, 0xd7, 0xe9, 0x03, 0x68, 0x4a, 0xa8, 0x0c}} fwpmConditionIPArrivalInterface = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x618a9b6d, Data2: 0x386b, Data3: 0x4136, Data4: [8]byte{0xad, 0x6e, 0xb5, 0x15, 0x87, 0xcf, 0xb1, 0xcd}} fwpmConditionIPLocalInterface = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x4cd62a49, Data2: 0x59c3, Data3: 0x4969, Data4: [8]byte{0xb7, 0xf3, 0xbd, 0xa5, 0xd3, 0x28, 0x90, 0xa4}} fwpmConditionIPLocalPort = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x0c1ba1af, Data2: 0x5765, Data3: 0x453f, Data4: [8]byte{0xaf, 0x22, 0xa8, 0xf7, 0x91, 0xac, 0x77, 0x5b}} // also FWPM_CONDITION_ICMP_TYPE fwpmConditionIPNexthopInterface = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x93ae8f5b, Data2: 0x7f6f, Data3: 0x4719, Data4: [8]byte{0x98, 0xc8, 0x14, 0xe9, 0x74, 0x29, 0xef, 0x04}} fwpmConditionIPProtocol = windows.GUID{Data1: 0x3971ef2b, Data2: 0x623e, Data3: 0x4f9a, Data4: [8]byte{0x8c, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0x79, 0xb8, 0x06, 0xb9, 0xa7}} fwpmConditionIPRemoteAddress = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xb235ae9a, Data2: 0x1d64, Data3: 0x49b8, Data4: [8]byte{0xa4, 0x4c, 0x5f, 0xf3, 0xd9, 0x09, 0x50, 0x45}} fwpmConditionIPRemotePort = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xc35a604d, Data2: 0xd22b, Data3: 0x4e1a, Data4: [8]byte{0x91, 0xb4, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x74, 0xee, 0x67, 0x4b}} // also FWPM_CONDITION_ICMP_CODE fwpmConditionALEAppID = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xd78e1e87, Data2: 0x8644, Data3: 0x4ea5, Data4: [8]byte{0x94, 0x37, 0xd8, 0x09, 0xec, 0xef, 0xc9, 0x71}} fwpmConditionALEUserID = windows.GUID{Data1: 0xaf043a0a, Data2: 0xb34d, Data3: 0x4f86, Data4: [8]byte{0x97, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0x03, 0x71, 0xaf, 0x6e, 0x66}} ) // dnsClientSID is the SID of Windows' DNS Client service, NT SERVICE\Dnscache. // Service SIDs derive from the service name, so it is the same everywhere (sc // showsid dnscache). const dnsClientSID = "S-1-5-80-859482183-879914841-863379149-1145462774-2388618682" // ff02::1:2, where DHCPv6 clients send to. A package-level variable never // moves, so conditions may refer to it through uintptr. var ipv6AllDHCPv6Servers = [16]byte{0xff, 0x02, 13: 0x01, 15: 0x02} type fwpByteBlob struct { size uint32 data *byte } // fwpValue0 is FWP_VALUE0 as well as FWP_CONDITION_VALUE0. Their union holds // a scalar of at most 32 bits, or a pointer for the larger types. type fwpValue0 struct { typ uint32 value uintptr } // fwpRange0 is FWP_RANGE0, which an FWP_RANGE_TYPE condition points to. type fwpRange0 struct { low, high fwpValue0 } type fwpmDisplayData0 struct { name *uint16 description *uint16 } type fwpmSession0 struct { sessionKey windows.GUID displayData fwpmDisplayData0 flags uint32 txnWaitTimeoutInMSec uint32 processID uint32 sid *windows.SID username *uint16 kernelMode int32 } type fwpmSublayer0 struct { subLayerKey windows.GUID displayData fwpmDisplayData0 flags uint32 providerKey *windows.GUID providerData fwpByteBlob weight uint16 } type fwpmFilterCondition0 struct { fieldKey windows.GUID matchType uint32 conditionValue fwpValue0 } type fwpmAction0 struct { typ uint32 filterType windows.GUID } type fwpmFilter0 struct { filterKey windows.GUID displayData fwpmDisplayData0 flags uint32 providerKey *windows.GUID providerData fwpByteBlob layerKey windows.GUID subLayerKey windows.GUID weight fwpValue0 numFilterConditions uint32 filterCondition *fwpmFilterCondition0 action fwpmAction0 _ uint32 // C aligns the following union to 8 bytes, as it holds a UINT64 providerContextKey windows.GUID reserved *windows.GUID _ [8 - unsafe.Sizeof(uintptr(0))]byte // and filterId as well, also on 32-bit filterID uint64 effectiveWeight fwpValue0 } // fwpmResult converts the DWORD status the Fwpm functions return. func fwpmResult(r1, _ uintptr, _ error) error { if r1 != 0 { return windows.Errno(r1) } return nil } func utf16Ptr(s string) *uint16 { p, _ := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(s) return p } func condition(field *windows.GUID, typ uint32, value uintptr) fwpmFilterCondition0 { return fwpmFilterCondition0{ fieldKey: *field, matchType: fwpMatchEqual, conditionValue: fwpValue0{typ: typ, value: value}, } } // leakFilters is what blockLeaks keeps from leaving outside the TUN. type leakFilters struct { traffic []leakTraffic // connections of these protocols and ports dnsClient bool // Windows' DNS Client service ipv4, ipv6 bool // an IP version altogether } // newLeakFilters turns expanded autoSystemWfpBlockLeak values into the filters // for a TUN that the routes of route4 (IPv4) and route6 (IPv6) lead to. func newLeakFilters(leaks []string, route4, route6 bool) leakFilters { var block leakFilters for _, leak := range leaks { switch leak { case "windnsclient": block.dnsClient = dnsClientUsesAnyPort() case "misconfigtun": block.ipv4, block.ipv6 = block.ipv4 || !route4, block.ipv6 || !route6 case "all": block.ipv4, block.ipv6 = true, true default: if traffic, ok := parseLeakTraffic(leak); ok { block.traffic = append(block.traffic, traffic) } } } return block } // String lists what block keeps inside the TUN, or is empty for nothing. func (block leakFilters) String() string { var blocked []string for _, traffic := range block.traffic { blocked = append(blocked, traffic.String()) } for _, b := range []struct { on bool what string }{{block.dnsClient, "windnsclient"}, {block.ipv4, "IPv4"}, {block.ipv6, "IPv6"}} { if b.on { blocked = append(blocked, b.what) } } return strings.Join(blocked, ", ") } // systemDNS tells whether block keeps the system's DNS inside the TUN: port // 53, the DNS Client service, or both IP versions altogether. func (block leakFilters) systemDNS() bool { return block.dnsClient || block.ipv4 && block.ipv6 || slices.ContainsFunc(block.traffic, func(traffic leakTraffic) bool { return traffic.covers("udp", 53) || traffic.covers("tcp", 53) }) } // dnsClientUsesAnyPort tells whether Windows' DNS Client service may send its // queries over HTTPS or TLS, and so to any port, which it does since Windows 11 // and Server 2022 (build 20348). Earlier versions only query port 53, and may // run the service in one process with others, which its filters would catch // as well. func dnsClientUsesAnyPort() bool { _, _, build := windows.RtlGetNtVersionNumbers() return build >= 20348 } // blockLeaks keeps traffic from leaving through interfaces other than tun, // for every program but Xray itself, whose outbounds (DNS included) use the // other interfaces on purpose: // // - traffic: connections of these protocols, TCP and UDP to some or all // ports, or ICMP, may only go through the TUN, those of DNS (53), DNS // over TLS (TCP 853) and DNS over QUIC (UDP 853) with "dns". Windows sends // a name query to the DNS servers of all interfaces, not only to those of // the TUN: to the first server of each interface, then to all of them when // no answer arrives within a second or two. It sends the queries for the // servers of an interface out through that interface, whatever the routes // say, and other programs reach an on-link resolver, like 192.168.1.1 from // DHCP, through its LAN route, which is more specific than the TUN's // default route. // - dnsClient: since Windows 11 and Server 2022, Windows may also send its // queries over HTTPS or TLS, to any port, so its DNS Client service may not // connect outside the TUN at all, except for name resolution on the local // link (mDNS, LLMNR). // - ipv4, ipv6: no IPv4, or no IPv6, at all outside the TUN, in either // direction: for a TUN that no route of that version leads to, or for // everything with "all". The TUN carries what is routed to it even without // an address of that IP version in gateway: Windows gives it link-local // ones itself, an IPv6 one at once, an IPv4 one from 169.254.0.0/16 after // some seconds (until then, IPv4 routed to the TUN is unreachable). // // Whatever is blocked, loopback, which cannot leave the system, and what // Windows itself needs on the local link stay allowed: DHCP, and for IPv6 // neighbor and multicast listener discovery. // // The filters live in a dynamic WFP session: closing the returned engine handle // with closeWFPEngine deletes them, and so does Windows when the process dies. func blockLeaks(tun winipcfg.LUID, block leakFilters) (windows.Handle, error) { engine, err := openWFPEngine() if err != nil { return 0, err } if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmTransactionBegin0.Call(uintptr(engine), 0)); err != nil { closeWFPEngine(engine) return 0, errors.New("FwpmTransactionBegin0 failed").Base(err) } err = addLeakFilters(engine, tun, block) if err == nil { if err = fwpmResult(procFwpmTransactionCommit0.Call(uintptr(engine))); err != nil { err = errors.New("FwpmTransactionCommit0 failed").Base(err) } } if err != nil { procFwpmTransactionAbort0.Call(uintptr(engine)) closeWFPEngine(engine) return 0, err } return engine, nil } func openWFPEngine() (windows.Handle, error) { if err := modfwpuclnt.Load(); err != nil { return 0, err } // txnWaitTimeoutInMSec stays 0 for BFE's default, so that a transaction // held by another program cannot hang the start forever. session := fwpmSession0{ displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: utf16Ptr("Xray TUN")}, flags: fwpmSessionFlagDynamic, } var engine windows.Handle if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmEngineOpen0.Call(0, rpcCAuthnWinNT, 0, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&session)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&engine)))); err != nil { return 0, errors.New("FwpmEngineOpen0 failed").Base(err) } return engine, nil } func closeWFPEngine(engine windows.Handle) { procFwpmEngineClose0.Call(uintptr(engine)) } // addLeakFilters adds the filters of blockLeaks in a sublayer of their own. // blockLeaks runs it in a transaction, so that they take effect all at once. func addLeakFilters(engine windows.Handle, tun winipcfg.LUID, block leakFilters) error { exe, err := os.Executable() if err != nil { return err } exePath, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(exe) if err != nil { return err } var appID *fwpByteBlob if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0.Call(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(exePath)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&appID)))); err != nil { return errors.New("FwpmGetAppIdFromFileName0 failed for ", exe).Base(err) } defer func() { procFwpmFreeMemory0.Call(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&appID))) }() sublayer := fwpmSublayer0{ displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: utf16Ptr("Xray TUN")}, weight: 0xffff, } if sublayer.subLayerKey, err = windows.GenerateGUID(); err != nil { return err } if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmSubLayerAdd0.Call(uintptr(engine), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&sublayer)), 0)); err != nil { return errors.New("FwpmSubLayerAdd0 failed").Base(err) } add := func(layer *windows.GUID, name string, flags, action uint32, weight uint8, conditions ...fwpmFilterCondition0) error { return addFilter(engine, &sublayer.subLayerKey, layer, "Xray TUN: "+name, flags, action, weight, conditions...) } var pinner runtime.Pinner defer pinner.Unpin() tunLUID := new(uint64) *tunLUID = uint64(tun) pinner.Pin(tunLUID) // the condition only holds it as uintptr // The heaviest matching filter of a sublayer decides. All sublayers have // their say, though, and a block in any of them beats a permit, unless // the permit is hard: it clears the action right, and then the blocks of // lower sublayers, Windows Firewall rules among them, no longer override // it, only a callout's veto does. Xray's own connections out get such a // hard permit. Connections from outside to Xray get an ordinary one, so // that firewalls keep guarding its inbounds. self := condition(&fwpmConditionALEAppID, fwpByteBlobType, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(appID))) // A connection goes through the TUN when its local address is the TUN's, // and it also leaves, or arrives, through the TUN. The local address alone // decides by default, but with weak host sending or receiving enabled, // packets of the TUN's address can use other interfaces. (The next hop, // the interface replies would leave by, is not known for arriving ones.) onTUN := func(field *windows.GUID) fwpmFilterCondition0 { return condition(field, fwpUint64, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(tunLUID))) } // toPorts matches the ports of traffic, if not all of them. toPorts := func(traffic leakTraffic) []fwpmFilterCondition0 { switch { case traffic.low == 0: return nil case traffic.low == traffic.high: return []fwpmFilterCondition0{condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, uintptr(traffic.low))} } ports := &fwpRange0{ low: fwpValue0{typ: fwpUint16, value: uintptr(traffic.low)}, high: fwpValue0{typ: fwpUint16, value: uintptr(traffic.high)}, } pinner.Pin(ports) // the condition only holds it as uintptr return []fwpmFilterCondition0{{ fieldKey: fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, matchType: fwpMatchRange, conditionValue: fwpValue0{typ: fwpRangeType, value: uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(ports))}, }} } // What stays allowed whatever is blocked, in both directions: replies to // a connection accepted from outside would leave through the physical // link as well. type permit struct { name string conditions []fwpmFilterCondition0 } loopback := permit{"loopback", []fwpmFilterCondition0{{ fieldKey: fwpmConditionFlags, matchType: fwpMatchFlagsAllSet, conditionValue: fwpValue0{typ: fwpUint32, value: fwpConditionFlagIsLoopback}, }}} // DHCP keeps the addresses of the other interfaces, which Xray's own // connections use. dhcp := permit{"DHCP", []fwpmFilterCondition0{ condition(&fwpmConditionIPProtocol, fwpUint8, windows.IPPROTO_UDP), condition(&fwpmConditionIPLocalPort, fwpUint16, 68), condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 67), }} // Neighbor and multicast listener discovery, ICMPv6 130-137 and 143, // whose type and code sit where the local and remote port are. discovery := permit{"IPv6 neighbor and multicast listener discovery", []fwpmFilterCondition0{condition(&fwpmConditionIPProtocol, fwpUint8, windows.IPPROTO_ICMPV6)}} for _, typ := range []uintptr{130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 143} { discovery.conditions = append(discovery.conditions, condition(&fwpmConditionIPLocalPort, fwpUint16, typ)) } discovery.conditions = append(discovery.conditions, condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 0)) dhcpv6 := []fwpmFilterCondition0{ condition(&fwpmConditionIPProtocol, fwpUint8, windows.IPPROTO_UDP), condition(&fwpmConditionIPLocalPort, fwpUint16, 546), condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 547), } // The DHCPv6 client sends to the servers' multicast address, and they // answer from their own. dhcpv6Out := permit{"DHCPv6", slices.Concat(dhcpv6, []fwpmFilterCondition0{condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemoteAddress, fwpByteArray16Type, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&ipv6AllDHCPv6Servers)))})} dhcpv6In := permit{"DHCPv6", dhcpv6} for _, layer := range []struct { key *windows.GUID selfFlags uint32 via *windows.GUID // the interface that has to be the TUN as well ipv6 bool permits []permit }{ {&fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV4, fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight, &fwpmConditionIPNexthopInterface, false, []permit{loopback, dhcp}}, {&fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV4, 0, &fwpmConditionIPArrivalInterface, false, []permit{loopback, dhcp}}, {&fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV6, fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight, &fwpmConditionIPNexthopInterface, true, []permit{loopback, discovery, dhcpv6Out}}, {&fwpmLayerALEAuthRecvAcceptV6, 0, &fwpmConditionIPArrivalInterface, true, []permit{loopback, discovery, dhcpv6In}}, } { throughTUN := []fwpmFilterCondition0{onTUN(&fwpmConditionIPLocalInterface), onTUN(layer.via)} if err := add(layer.key, "permit Xray", layer.selfFlags, fwpActionPermit, 4, self); err != nil { return err } for _, p := range layer.permits { if err := add(layer.key, "permit "+p.name, 0, fwpActionPermit, 3, p.conditions...); err != nil { return err } } for _, traffic := range block.traffic { protocol := uintptr(windows.IPPROTO_UDP) switch { case traffic.protocol == "tcp": protocol = windows.IPPROTO_TCP case traffic.protocol == "icmp" && layer.ipv6: protocol = windows.IPPROTO_ICMPV6 case traffic.protocol == "icmp": protocol = windows.IPPROTO_ICMP } matches := slices.Concat([]fwpmFilterCondition0{condition(&fwpmConditionIPProtocol, fwpUint8, protocol)}, toPorts(traffic)) if err := add(layer.key, "permit "+traffic.String()+" through the TUN", 0, fwpActionPermit, 3, slices.Concat(matches, throughTUN)...); err != nil { return err } if err := add(layer.key, "block "+traffic.String(), 0, fwpActionBlock, 2, matches...); err != nil { return err } } if family := "IPv4"; layer.ipv6 && block.ipv6 || !layer.ipv6 && block.ipv4 { if layer.ipv6 { family = "IPv6" } if err := add(layer.key, "permit "+family+" through the TUN", 0, fwpActionPermit, 1, throughTUN...); err != nil { return err } if err := add(layer.key, "block "+family, 0, fwpActionBlock, 0); err != nil { return err } } } // Since Windows 11 and Server 2022, the DNS Client service may also send // the queries for an interface's servers over HTTPS or TLS, out through // that interface and to any port. So there it may only connect through // the TUN, except for mDNS and LLMNR, which stay on the local link (over // an IP version only while it is not blocked altogether). Like Windows // Firewall's rules for it, the filters recognize the service by its SID, // which Windows puts in the token of its process: the security descriptor // grants that SID the right to match (FWP_ACTRL_MATCH_FILTER, CC in SDDL). if block.dnsClient { sd, err := windows.SecurityDescriptorFromString("O:SYG:SYD:(A;;CCRC;;;" + dnsClientSID + ")") if err != nil { return err } sdBlob := &fwpByteBlob{size: sd.Length(), data: (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(sd))} pinner.Pin(sdBlob) // the condition only holds it as uintptr dnsClient := condition(&fwpmConditionALEUserID, fwpSecurityDescriptorType, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(sdBlob))) // Conditions on the same field match when any of them does. mdnsLLMNR := []fwpmFilterCondition0{dnsClient, condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 5353), condition(&fwpmConditionIPRemotePort, fwpUint16, 5355)} for _, layer := range []struct { key *windows.GUID localLink bool }{ {&fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV4, !block.ipv4}, {&fwpmLayerALEAuthConnectV6, !block.ipv6}, } { if err := add(layer.key, "permit the DNS Client service through the TUN", 0, fwpActionPermit, 3, dnsClient, onTUN(&fwpmConditionIPLocalInterface), onTUN(&fwpmConditionIPNexthopInterface)); err != nil { return err } if layer.localLink { if err := add(layer.key, "permit the DNS Client service's mDNS and LLMNR", 0, fwpActionPermit, 3, mdnsLLMNR...); err != nil { return err } } if err := add(layer.key, "block the DNS Client service", 0, fwpActionBlock, 2, dnsClient); err != nil { return err } } } return nil } func addFilter(engine windows.Handle, sublayer, layer *windows.GUID, name string, flags, action uint32, weight uint8, conditions ...fwpmFilterCondition0) error { filter := fwpmFilter0{ displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: utf16Ptr(name)}, flags: flags, layerKey: *layer, subLayerKey: *sublayer, weight: fwpValue0{typ: fwpUint8, value: uintptr(weight)}, numFilterConditions: uint32(len(conditions)), action: fwpmAction0{typ: action}, } if len(conditions) > 0 { filter.filterCondition = &conditions[0] } if err := fwpmResult(procFwpmFilterAdd0.Call(uintptr(engine), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&filter)), 0, 0)); err != nil { return errors.New("FwpmFilterAdd0 failed for ", name).Base(err) } return nil } // dnsOutsideTUN returns the servers outside all of prefixes, the TUN's own // subnets and routes: queries to them cannot go through the TUN. func dnsOutsideTUN(servers []netip.Addr, prefixes []netip.Prefix) []netip.Addr { var outside []netip.Addr for _, server := range servers { server = server.Unmap() if !slices.ContainsFunc(prefixes, func(p netip.Prefix) bool { return p.Contains(server) }) { outside = append(outside, server) } } return outside } // flushDNSCache drops the answers Windows cached so far, like ipconfig // /flushdns, so that names get resolved again with the current DNS setup. func flushDNSCache() error { if err := procDnsFlushResolverCache.Find(); err != nil { return err } if r, _, err := procDnsFlushResolverCache.Call(); r == 0 { return err } return nil }